Finally, we wanted to give policymakers an easier way to engage with industry-level estimates than the usual appendix tables. So we built a narrative dashboard. Users can explore the estimates industry by industry, and see the assumptions needed for them to cohere into a single story. 9/

Second, we validate our Ukraine findings against the Annual Business Survey (ABS), whose 2023 data has just reached researchers. Our estimates agree strongly in sign with the ABS overall, by industry and for large firms. Small firms diverge more, reflecting sampling. 7/

In contrast to the Ukraine gas shock, more-exposed firms mainly raise prices and build inventories. We do not yet see responses on forward-looking margins, such as investment, or on balance sheets. 6/

We found large differences in firm responses, between and within industries; responses correlated across adjustment margins; and dynamics that play out over the short to medium term. 4/

So we cleaned and standardised the ONS' rapid-response survey, the BICS, and linked it and quarterly business register data to firm-level energy expenditure shares from before the crisis, to estimate high-frequency firm responses in a shift-share design. 3/

How can we give policymakers the timely, causal, granular evidence they need to respond to crises as they unfold? A short thread on our updated working paper with @trfetzer.com, @christinavpalmou.bsky.social and @iyotzov.bsky.social.

When the zone expanded in 2021 (removing resident exemptions), effects persisted but were smaller, consistent with adaptation behaviour. House prices however *fell* inside the new boundary. This is because residents now also had to pay the tax. 9/

Higher-income groups responded more strongly on all margins. Lower-income drivers were more likely to just pay the charge rather than adapt. This has important equity implications for pollution pricing design. 8/

The policy worked for its primary goal: drivers shifted away from older petrol and diesel cars. For every 1% of commuters affected, ultra-low emission vehicle (ULEV) adoption rose by 0.4 to 0.6% – a big effect when only ~2% of vehicles were electric in 2019. 4/

London's ULEZ charges £12.50/day to drive polluting vehicles into designated areas. It was announced and rolled out in phases between 2015 and 2023, creating natural experiments as boundaries expanded across the city. 2/

NEW: How did the introduction of the Ultra-Low Emissions Zone (ULEZ) change London’s geography of work? In a new @theifs.bsky.social paper, @joelkariel.bsky.social, Fizza Jabbar and I have taken a look – and it turns out people adapt in surprising ways. A thread. 1/

Yesterday was my last day at the CMA. It has been a real honour helping to build its research function over the last three years. This therefore seems like a good opportunity to highlight a few things we have published in recent years. 1/

On my way home from our fourth annual CMA-Durham workshop on productivity, dynamism and market power. A few reflections: 1) Lots of emphasis on diffusion and dynamism. Drivers (networks, GPTs, well-targeted policies) and barriers (market power, information frictions, input bottlenecks). 1/

At the William Morris Gallery today. Food for thought from an earlier era of automation and deskilling, and the resulting backlash.

Finally, we examine the remaining data and evidence gaps for the industrial strategy, and highlight the importance of careful design, paying for instance attention to threshold effects. We highlight the need for better microdata to monitor and evaluate the new industrial policy over time. 12/

The industrial strategy is of course part of the government's wider growth mission. We therefore consider how other pillars of the growth mission might interact with it. Investment and skills shortages in particular may constrain how effective industrial policies will be in some sectors. 11/

The productivity effects of the industrial policy will depend on economies of scale in the targeted sectors, and on wider spillover effects. We examine both. We show that the targeted sectors are more connected and more upstream than the typical sector, which should help with spillovers. 10/

We also look at the regional distribution of establishments in the growth-driving sectors. It differs from the regional distribution of past subsidies, suggesting that gains from the new industrial strategy may vary across regions and devolved nations. 9/

For each sector, we undertake a detailed assessment of its component industries. Here is for example advanced manufacturing. We hope this helps policymakers monitor and target its industrial strategy, and consider competition-enhancing tools where needed. 8/

Turning to what the government calls the "growth-driving" sectors in the industrial strategy green paper, we show that they are indeed more productive, competitive and dynamic than the overall economy. 7/

Effect sizes also vary substantially by instrument. Of course, since industrial policies are by their very nature targeted, even when we exploit the timing of policies there are likely still some remaining selection effects. 6/

There is suggestive evidence both at the industry and regional level that increased exposure to industrial policies is associated with subsequently higher productivity. But as data on industrial policies is still new and under development, we often lack statistical power to distinguish effects. 5/

The UK also conducts more of its industrial policies via tax credits than other instruments, such as loans, guarantees and capital injections. 4/

First, countries differ in how much they spend on industrial policies, what they spend it on, and what policy instruments they use. In recent years, the UK has spent relatively more than its peers on mining and quarrying (which contains oil and gas), wholesale and retail, and ICT. 3/

One interesting finding: the dispersion of labour productivity continues to increase in services, and decrease in manufacturing. The latter may be a selection effect, as the UK manufacturing share continues to fall (second chart from our State of Competition report). 2/

The ONS today published its latest productivity and business dynamism bulletin. Headline figures: no change year-on-year to average markups, job reallocation or the overall labour productivity distribution. www.ons.gov.uk/economy/econ... 1/

One advantage of reading Material World only now is that I have been playing around with @trfetzer.com, @prashantgarg.bsky.social and @econopete.bsky.social's AIPNET alongside reading the book, allowing me to explore some of these supply chain linkages myself. Highly recommend! 4/4

Relatedly, our report on labour market power in the UK found that while hybrid vacancies are still concentrated in the least concentrated (mostly dense, urban) labour markets, the rise of hybrid working has led to a shift in where work is performed (out of city centres into surrounding suburbs).

We therefore conclude the report with a simple clustering exercise that shows how competition and competitive outcomes vary in complex ways across the economy, and that any single competition measure will miss this complexity. Detailed IO industry studies are needed to round out the picture. 25/

Ownership networks span businesses within and across industries, and as we show in our earlier report, a sizeable fraction of firms also has market power in the labour market. 24/