Jon Green

@jongreen

Assistant professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University jgreen4919.github.io

578 Following5,495 Followers3,352 Posts

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Jon Green@jongreen· 14d

"what is public opinion?" - the greatest thread in the history of forums, locked by a moderator after 12,239 pages of heated debate,

jessica tarlov: Your average Republican is pro-IVF, skeptical of six week heartbeat bills, against drporting productive, law-abiding immigrants, and for gay marriage

andrew lawrence (QT): your average republican thinks theres kitty litter boxes in classrooms and immigrants are eating your pets. your average republican cares more about a Black actress playing the little mermaid

Jon Green@jongreen· 26d

lots going on here, but I love that people who said it was 50/50 whether they'd vote turned out at almost exactly 50% bluelabs.com/dynamic-elec...

Actual turnout by self-reported prospective turnout via BlueLabs. Respondents who said they would definitely vote or had already voted have near-100% actual turnout. Respondents who say they will probably vote have ~75% turnout. Respondents who say they're 50/50 to vote or will probably not vote have ~50% turnout. Respondents who say they will definitely not vote have ~25% turnout. Respondents who say they don't know if they'll vote have ~70% turnout.

Jon Green@jongreen· 27d

late to this good post. it's a weird industry! the points about lack of accountability and lack of risk taking are related -- unless something's radically changed in the last ten years, the market rewards binary win/loss and not vote share relative to expectations www.jstor.org/stable/43862...

Martin and Peskowitz (2015): Parties and Electoral Performance in the Market for Political Consultants

Abstract: We investigate whether the hiring relationships of candidates and political con- sulting firms better resembles the predictions of the "adversarial" or "allied" models of consultant-party interaction. We find that the highest-quality consultants are not allocated to the most competitive races, consultant-candidate relationships persist even as candidates' electoral prospects change, and firms who work for challengers face a higher risk of market exit than firms working for incumbents. The market focuses entirely on win-loss records and ignores the information on consultant performance available in candidates' vote shares. These findings depict a market driven by individual candidate, rather than aggregate party,

Jon Green@jongreen· Jul 13

tuxedo winnie the pooh meme: political / sociopolitical

tuxedo winnie the pooh meme: demographic / sociodemographic

Jon Green@jongreen· Jul 9

saying you're dropping out but waiting until the absolute last moment possible to file the necessary paperwork is very consistent with this take! www.joshbarro.com/p/low-consci...

Jon Green@jongreen· Jul 6

we apologise again for the fault in the suspensions. those responsible for suspending the people who have just been suspended have been suspended

Jon Green@jongreen· Jul 4

plate check

Ribs, Mac and cheese, salad, berries, beer

Jon Green@jongreen· Jul 4

blessing your timeline with conjoined twin strawberries

Jon Green@jongreen· Jun 30

McCarty (2004), "The Appointments Dilemma" onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10....

As I will demonstrate, a key issue in determining whether or not the separation of powers generates inefficient policies is the extent to which the executive can commit to not changing the agency's ideal point after the budget has been allocated but before policy has been set by the agency. If the executive cannot make such a commitment, the legislature will have to take account of potential executive opportunism by further restricting the agency's discretion by lowering its budget proposal. Alternatively, if the executive could commit to a moderate agency, the legislature would pass a more generous budget which might make the executive better off and ameliorate the appointments dilemma.

Obviously, a key factor which determines the executive's ability to commit to a particular agency ideal point are the constitutional and legal provisions concerning the executive's ability to remove agency officials. If the executive lacks removal power (such as the case of independent commissioners in the United States), he will be unable to manipulate the agency's ideal point after budgetary decisions are made. However, if the agency head serves at the executive's will, ex post manipulation will be easier.

Jon Green@jongreen· Jun 29

Jon Green@jongreen· Jun 7

RETVRN

Jon Green@jongreen· Jun 7

baseball

Jon Green@jongreen· Jun 4

lol

82-0 with:
Ja Morant (MEM 2020s)
Kevin Durant (GSW 2010s)
Elgin Baylor (LAL 1960s)
Larry Bird (BOS 1980s)
Wilt Chamberlain (PHI 1960s)

Jon Green@jongreen· May 24

Recently I took a friend with only a high school degree out for a drink. Insensitively, I led him in to my local microbrewery. Suddenly I saw his face freeze up as he was confronted with beers such as “gose” and “hazy IPA” and ingredients like lactose, cacao nibs and caraway seeds. I quickly asked him if he wanted to go somewhere else and he anxiously nodded yes and we went down the street for Miller Lites.

Jon Green@jongreen· May 21

when we get the autopsy report on this autopsy report

We apologise again for the fault in the subtitles. Those responsible for sacking the people who have just been sacked, have been sacked.

Jon Green@jongreen· May 21

in fairness, if the guy I commissioned to write my "why did we lose this presidential election?" report gets stuff like "who was president when this happened?" wrong I'd distance myself from it too

Nowhere was this more apparent than in the 2022 Georgia Senate election, where Republicans supported Herschel Walker to take on incumbent Democratic Senator Raphael Warnock. Despite a series of false and unverifiable claims by Walker, as well as the near-complete absence of a comprehensive policy agenda, endorsements by Donald Trump and Mitch McConnell were enough to take the senate race to a runoff when neither candidate was able to claim 50% of the vote in the first round.

This was a blatant attempt by the Republican power base to take advantage of name recognition and tough economic conditions to push through an unqualified candidate whose job would have been little more than rubber stamping the president’s agenda[Note: in 2022, Joe Biden was president.]. Walker’s inability to muster even a shred of credibility precluded him from winning the election in one of the most polarized states in the nation.

Jon Green@jongreen· May 21

This isn't exactly the problem described in Hollow Parties, but it's not *not* the problem described in Hollow Parties. Why aren't you doing this in-house???

Disclaimer: This document reflects the views of the author, not the DNC. The DNC was notprovided with the underlying sourcing, interviews, or supporting data for many of theassertions contained herein and therefore cannot independently verify the claims presented.

Jon Green@jongreen· May 21

what a mess www.cnn.com/2026/05/21/p...

“When I was elected DNC chair, I commissioned an after action review of the 2024 election that I wanted to be honest and transparent, and with actionable and specific takeaways for the future of the Democratic Party. When I received the report late last year, it wasn’t ready for primetime — not even close — and because no source material was provided, it would have meant starting over. I could not in good faith put the DNC’s stamp of approval on the report that was produced.”

“After last November’s massive Democratic wins, I didn’t want to create a distraction, but by not putting the report out, I ended up creating an even bigger distraction. For that, I sincerely apologize. For full transparency, I am releasing the report as we received it, in its entirety, unedited and unabridged. It does not meet my standards, and it won’t meet your standards, but I am doing this because people need to be able to trust the Democratic Party and trust our word.”

Jon Green@jongreen· May 20

real data visualization heads will need to dig into the appendix

Figure H.1: Co-listening behavior. Each line connects shows (nested within intermediate level show blocks) that respondents listed together; thicker lines represent more frequent co-listening behavior. Block color is listener-weighted show median among shows with left/right estimates;
line color averages between show-level left/right estimates (gray where either co-listed show had insufficient political episodes to be included in left/right estimates).

Figure H.2: Show-pair political discussion frequency (left) and left/right distance (right), sorted by pair averages.

Jon Green@jongreen· May 20

but if you first infer metadata for a wide range of shows, you can aggregate across similar shows (i.e. even if we can't characterize the audience for show X, we can say "shows like X have audiences like Y") and get more precise estimates of what people are actually consuming

Figure 5: Correlates of block-level listening behavior among podcast listeners, for blocks with at least 100 listeners. Point ranges reflect logistic regression coefficients with 95% uncertainty intervals. Black point ranges are statistically significant.

Figure 8: Political knowledge by exposure group. Groups defined by average self-reported show-level political news frequency and average show-level political discussion frequency relative to median (0.17).

Jon Green@jongreen· May 20

new WP (w/ @stecula.bsky.social): we infer show-level metadata for a large sample of popular politics and politics-adjacent podcasts, then merge it with survey data to characterize political information exposure for their audiences link: osf.io/ycujf/files/...

title: A Framework for Studying Podcasts and their Audiences at Scale
authors: Jon Green and Dominik Stecula
abstract: A large and increasing share of media consumption in the United States takes place on podcasts. However, two of the most theoretically interesting features of this development also make it difficult to study empirically: the boundary between political and non-political shows is porous, and the audience is highly fragmented in ways that frustrate standard survey research. We address these challenges by first inferring political discussion frequency, relative left/right
orientation, and network cluster in a sample of roughly 7,600 popular shows that are either categorized as political or share at least one guest with a show categorized as political. We then demonstrate how these show-level metadata can be incorporated into survey research to
dramatically broaden and deepen our understanding of the political information consumption in this developing ecosystem.

Figure 2. Hierarchical stochastic block model results. Colors reflect terminal (lowest-level) block pairs.

Figure 4: Audience profiles for show blocks with at least 100 listeners. All values for show blocks reflect averages across respondents who listen to at least one show in the given block unless otherwise noted. Respondents can list up to three shows.

Figure 7: Left/Right distributions of shows, overall (a) and weighted by audience (b). Both distributions are limited to shows with at least ten episodes classified as likely to feature political discussion.

Jon Green@jongreen· May 19

new WP (w/ @ntd.bsky.social): we use the case of Christian nationalism to make a broader point about "niche ideologies" in mass opinion research, and why you shouldn't scale them the same way you'd scale more general attitudes Link: osf.io/wbdut/files/...

Title: Niche Ideologies in the Mass Public: The Case of
Christian Nationalism
Authors: Jon Green, Nick Davis
Abstract: It is common in survey research to measure political attitudes by inferring latent dimensions along which all respondents can be scored. We argue that this approach is ill-suited for the study of “niche ideologies” that organize the beliefs of concentrated minorities within specific political domains. We support this argument with the case of Christian nationalism, which is theorized as an ideology but typically measured as an attitude. Across two survey samples, we show that response patterns are better explained by a process in which individuals endorse, reject, or are unfamiliar with clusters of beliefs associated with Christian nationalism than by processes in which responses are dimensional. We then demonstrate that measuring Christian
nationalism as an attitude can distort its relationship with theoretically relevant policy preferences. Our results clarify distinctions between attitudes and ideologies and offer suggestions for how to investigate other niche ideologies in mass opinion research.

Figure 1. Distributions of Posterior Probabilities by DGP. Group-based is strongly preferred (higher probabilities for vast majority of respondents) in both BRS and PRRI samples.

Figure 3: Ideological identification by DGP. The Rejecter group is majority liberal across both samples with few conservatives; the Adherent group is majority conservative across both samples with few liberals.

Figure 6: Comparing group- versus dimensional-based estimates of the relationship between Christian nationalism and abortion attitudes (PRRI 2022). All models control for age, education, race, gender, party identification, and ideological identification.

When Christian nationalism is measured as a single dimension factor, it has positive relationships with both support for overturning Roe v. Wade and for more restrictive abortion policy. But when Christian nationalism is measured via a group-based mixture, being in the Adherent (vs. Innocent) group is only positively associated with more restrictive abortion policy, but not with support for overturning Roe v. Wade.

Jon Green@jongreen· May 3

come on!!!

alexbward on X: President Trump did not announce an escort mission just now, US officials say.

Project Freedom, earlier called the Maritime Freedom Construct, is a coordination cell.

It'll tell US-flagged ships and others the safe lanes to navigate the Strait of Hormuz (aka no mines, etc.)

Jon Green@jongreen· Apr 26

men in their 30s when they see another man in their 30s with a copy of Dungeon Crawler Carl

Jon Green@jongreen· Apr 22

Political compass meme
Authoritarian left: everything is revisionist propaganda except actual revisionist propaganda, which is fine
Authoritarian right: everything is genocide except actual genocide, which is fine
Libertarian right: everything is slavery except actual slavery, which is fine
Libertarian left: everything is theft except actual theft, which is fine

Jon Green@jongreen· Apr 3

I stg this is the type of headline it seems like people on here want to read

edited headline: FEMA Official Says He Teleported to Waffle House He Was Obviously Just Blackout Drunk. We Are Exactly the Same Type of Progressive as You.

Jon Green@jongreen· Apr 3

extremely happy to share that "Political Pundits and the Maintenance of Ideological Coalitions" is conditionally accepted at @polbehavior.bsky.social osf.io/8c3fr/files/...

Title: Political Pundits and the Maintenance of Ideological Coalitions
Authors: Allison Wan and Jon Green
Abstract: Political ideologies help groups advance diverse sets of interests under common agendas. However, it is unclear how these groups maintain their norms regarding what it means to be
a member in good standing in a dynamic information environment. Building on theories of “long” political coalitions, we hypothesize that ideological elites’ rhetorical influence on one another will tend to be concentrated and specialized with respect to specific concepts. We
find support for this expectation using an original dataset of over 1,000 prominent political pundits in the United States, in which we infer coalition membership and the diffusion of novel language over a range of specific concepts. While pundits may discuss many concepts,
they tend to “send” language to other pundits in relatively few, resulting in both concentration and specialization of influence within coalitions. These results clarify conceptual distinctions between political ideologies and political philosophies, and demonstrate real-time dynamics of contemporary ideological coalitions.

Figure 1: Stylized expectations. Each node reflects a hypothetical coalition member, colors denote concepts, and arrows indicate members’ influence on each other. For example, member (a) influences members (b), (c), and (e) with respect to one concept, such as immigration, while member (d) influences members (b), (c), and (e) with respect to a different concept, such as health care. Member (e) acts as a broker, both sending and receiving influence across the coalition. Every member is influential, but influence tends to be concentrated (for any given concept, one member accounts for 3/4 of influence) and specialized (4/5 members are influential on only one concept).

Figure 3: Concentration of influence within concepts, observed network compared to permuted networks. Degree, Community, and Concept denote structural features either are or are not preserved in network permutations.

Figure 4: Specialization of influence within concepts, observed network compared to permuted networks. Degree, Community, and Concept denote structural features either are or are not preserved in network permutations.

Jon Green@jongreen· Mar 22

this will be the sixth time that we have destroyed woke and we have become exceedingly efficient at it

Jon Green@jongreen· Mar 19

"He can't keep getting away with it!" meme but it's "We can't keep getting away with it"

Jon Green@jongreen· Mar 19

quite a statement about how improbable this score was that it still only implied a 37% chance of the upset