Martin Gardner

@mglovesfun

Betting shop worker. Former French-English interpreter. Love a crazy lawsuit. Medieval French enthusiast. Former tournament Scrabble player. MLB fan. Movie reviews.

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Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

How many times I expected to hear ‘Strait of Hormuz’ this year v. how many times I've actually heard it.

Bar chart shows ‘Expected’ at 1, while ‘Actual’ is at 4,217.

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

Absurdity aside, Trump's 20% idea didn't even last a whole 24 hours.

Donald J. Trump
@realDonaldTrump

Oil is flowing like never before, thanks to the awesome Power of the United States Military. A special salute to Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dan Caine, and Commander of the United States Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper. Because of them, and all members of the Most Powerful Military anywhere in the World, BY FAR, the Strait of Hormuz is open to ALL Ship traffic except for Iran — and that is because of their lying, violent, malicious leadership, which is taking them down the path of TOTAL DESTRUCTION. We will therefore have a FULL Blockade, but only on Ships coming to and from Iranian ports, or carrying anything have to do with Iranian cargo. Based on highly productive conversations with Middle East leadership, I have decided to replace the 20% United States Reimbursement Fee with Trade and Investment Deals that the various Gulf States will be making into the United States. Those Investments will be MASSIVE but, at the same time,

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

To finish off, footnote 70. There are complaints against both Woodward and Blanche ongoing.

70 Ethics complaints have been filed in New York and the District of Colombia against
Acting Attorney General Blanche and Associate Attorney General Woodward. See Letter
to Attorney Grievance Committee Re: Ethics Complaint Against Todd Blanche,
https://dea5edf3-e27d-4adc-a42a
b9c082bc3167.usrfiles.com/ugd/dea5ed_b024aad49d1049c1ab03f01e8f1aa7fc.pdf; see
also Request for Investigation of Stanley E. Woodward, Jr. D.C. Bar No. 997320,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28264896-cfa-dc-bar-complaint-stanley
woodward/.

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

Bar referrals for two of the most senior officials in the DOJ.

Finally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this

[footnotes and page break]

Order to the State Bar of New York, of which Acting Attorney General Blanche is a
member (No. 4192456), AND to the District of Columbia Bar, of which Associate Attorney
General Woodward is a member (No. 997320), where disciplinary proceedings are
currently ongoing.

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

The court's managed to find a 1987 case where the Fifth Circuit ordered just this. How about that. Good work by the clerks.

4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 12 (emphasis added); see also Morales v. Turman, 820
F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1987) (attorneys’ fees may be awarded to appointed amici if the
amici’s services were highly beneficial and defendants were properly considered the
parties who made the services necessary). Nonetheless, the Court-appointed amici have
declined any reimbursement for their important service to the Court.

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

Well, this is a new one on me. She's inviting amici to claim their legal fees(?)

The Court finds monetary sanctions appropriate under its inherent authority and
prerogative to police the matters and litigants who avail themselves of its jurisdiction. See
Purchasing Power, LLC, 851 F.3d at 1223 (“Courts have the inherent power to police
those appearing before them.”) (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46).67 These monetary
sanctions would include the attorneys’ fees incurred by Court-appointed amici68 in

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

The other reason Trump's argument were dumb is the court has inherent authority to punish misconduct in front of it.

C. Inherent Authority
Having concluded that sanctions are warranted under Rule 11, the Court will now
address whether sanctions are likewise appropriate under the Court’s inherent authority.

[footnotes and page break]

Although Rule 11 limits imposing monetary sanctions following a voluntary dismissal, the
Court’s inherent authority remains available to address conduct that abuses the judicial
process. Trump v. Clinton, 161 F.4th 671, 688 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Federal courts have the
inherent authority to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial
process.”); Peer, 571 F. App’x at 844 (“And the inherent power of a court can be invoked
even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct . . . for these rules are not
substitutes for the inherent power.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

Spoiler alert.

of limitations.”). Accordingly, the Court must now determine what sanctions, if any, are
appropriate. See id. (noting that “Rule 11 sanctions are discretionary” and therefore “just
because a district court can impose sanctions does not mean that the court is required to
do so.”) (citation omitted).

3. Sanctions are Appropriate.

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized three instances in which Rule 11 sanctions
are appropriate: where a pleading (1) “has no reasonable factual basis”; (2) “is based on
a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced
as a reasonable argument to change existing law”; or (3) is “in bad faith for an improper
purpose.” Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Worldwide
Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996)). This Order discusses
whether Rule 11 sanctions are warranted under the improper purpose prong.60

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

I seem to think Trump went with the whole "21-day safe harbor" thing, which is a different part of rule 11. That's 11(c)(2) and refers to a motion for sanctions. On the court's own initiative is 11(c)(3) (and 11(c)(1) is "in general", and, IMO, applies here).

courts.” Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). As
relevant here, when an attorney files a pleading in federal court, he certifies that, among
other things, the pleading is not being presented for an improper purpose. FED. R. CIV. P.
11(B); Spolter v. SunTrust Bank, 403 F. App’x 387, 391 (11th Cir. 2010). Because this
question strikes at the heart of the integrity of the judicial process, the Court may raise
the improper purpose inquiry sua sponte and at any time. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3); see
also id. advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“The time when sanctions are to
be imposed rests in the discretion of the trial judge.”).

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

Trump v. Clinton mentioned!

And because this fact was so obvious and so insurmountable, the Court finds that
this matter was brought for an improper purpose—to gain the imprimatur of judicial
legitimacy for a “settlement” that had no viable basis in law or fact. As was observed in
another matter brought in this District, “this case is part of Mr. Trump’s pattern of misusing
the courts to serve political purposes.” Trump v. Clinton, 653 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1219
(S.D. Fla. 2023).

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

This whole page is worth reading. It's scathing.

In dismissing the non-parties’ claims of collusion, Plaintiffs reveal the true position
of the Parties and say the quiet part out loud: “Regardless of whether Plaintiffs had ever
filed this action, the Government and Plaintiffs still had the power to resolve all disputes
between the parties.” (DE 89 at 15). The power to resolve was never a question before
this Court. Whether Executive Branch actors can privately agree to give themselves and
their former clients blanket immunities and billions of dollars in tax monies for legally
undefined grievances was never an issue advanced to this Court. The question is whether
the Parties could do so by claiming to be adverse and engaging the legitimacy of a court
proceeding. The answer is a resounding “no”: the Lead Plaintiff and the Government are
one, a fully realized unitary interest. Because “Plaintiffs have no answer for the fact that

Page 37 of 56

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

And it specifically calls this out for being unlawful, which I'm surprised at, just because it's not being litigated in front of the court.

Moreover, the Release Order, signed only by Acting Attorney General Blanche,
extends a blanket grant of immunity to all Plaintiffs and their families and “affiliates,” and
precludes all “current or possible” investigations or actions before any other agencies or
departments.50 The Release Order also purports to bar the IRS from conducting any
future tax audits of President Trump, his sons, and their entities.51 This provision directly
contravenes 26 U.S.C. § 7217, titled “Prohibition on executive branch influence over
taxpayer audits and other investigations,” which states:
It shall be unlawful for any applicable person to request, directly or
indirectly, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service to
conduct or terminate an audit or other investigation of any particular
taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer.
26 U.S.C. § 7217(a).
The explicit text of this statute prohibits President Trump and his lawyers—one of
whom was former White House Counsel—from asking for or promoting termination of an
audit directed toward him.52 And acquiescing to any such demand is wholly incompatible

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

The court points out this bullshit that I don't think the amici even pointed out, but has been pointed out elsewhere. Woodward and Blanche's former clients all stood to profit from the "agreement".

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

This is/was a crock for various reasons. First of all, in Keepseagle, Keepseagle undeniably didn't control the US Government. And it took ten years of litigation to get to a settlement. Which was finally signed off (IIRC) after 14 years.

were “one and the same.” Veazie, 49 U.S. at 256. In justifying the “unusual”36 settlement
to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims, the DOJ and Acting Attorney General Blanche in a press
release, and Acting Attorney General Blanche’s Congressional testimony respectively,
cited Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 99-cv-03119, (D.D.C. 1999), as the “precedent” for the
unprecedented establishment of the $1.776 billion dollar fund. However, Plaintiffs’ briefing
is conspicuously silent as to this justification, making no mention of the Keepseagle case.
Understandably so.37
In Keepseagle, the parties—including the Department of Agriculture represented
by the DOJ—engaged in a decade-long litigation regarding alleged discrimination
perpetrated against thousands of Native American farmers and ranchers who had been
illegally denied farm loans and access to benefit programs. Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 118
F. Supp. 3d 98, 104 (D.D.C. 2015). As the presiding judge observed, “[i]t was a major
class-action seeking to remedy what many felt was the latest chapter in the federal
government’s sordid history of mistreating Native Americans.” Id. at 104. There, “[f]or

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

Holy crap, the court is citing Trump v. Slaughter for the proposition that Trump controls the entity that he's suing.

subordinates in government service at will. Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U.S. __, slip op. at
16 (2026). Finding that he could, the majority ruled that “[s]ubordinates who exercise the
President’s power are subject to removal by him. Then, and only then, can they remain
accountable to the President, and the President to the people.” Id. at 36. “[T]hese officers
exercise the President’s power, not their own, and thus must be responsible to him.” Id.
at 35 (emphasis in original).

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

This one is rather a banger.

WL 3543414, at *6 (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2024) (“The Court finds that Plaintiffs do in fact
control Defendant Reticulum and that no case or controversy exists between Plaintiffs
and [Defendant Reticulum], necessitating [Defendant] Reticulum’s dismissal from the
present case.”). Courts “do not engage in the academic pastime of rendering judgments
in favor of persons against themselves.” Interstate Com. Comm’n, 337 U.S. at 430.
Consonant with the general principle that “no person may sue himself[,]” adverseness is
lacking where one party controls the other party. Id.; see Dasma Inv., LLC v. Realty

Page 16 of 56

Martin Gardner@mglovesfun· 29d

This is for rather obvious reasons that the court discusses much later on. Otherwise, plaintiffs could file a vexatious lawsuit and then avoid sanctions by dismissing the suit before the court can act.