Serhii Rieznik says it's the real Hektor👇 honestly I'm still confused by all of this so I will be cautious and no clicking on DM links if any

Recently, the Laura “Lori” Loomer conversion has made quite a few waves online. Personally, I made plenty of memes about her in my time, because not long ago she was one of the loudest American voices repeating russian propaganda about Ukraine.

Looks like Hektor's accout was hacked 👇 what's this nonsense about "buying an account on X" 🙄 clearly not him anymore and maybe for some time already

A person is not resistant to propaganda simply because they can recognize it coming from an enemy. Real resistance begins when they can recognize it coming through their own side. And now, you know.

The easiest propaganda to recognize is propaganda that insults you. The hardest propaganda to recognize is propaganda that praises your values, validates your anger and tells you that repeating it proves you belong.

Can people be educated against propaganda from their own side? Personally, I think they can. But not by teaching them only "who" the enemy is. They must be taught how manipulation works, even when recognizing it becomes socially very uncomfortable.

A trusted person can repeat something false. A large account can misunderstand events. A political ally can manipulate an audience. A person can sincerely believe a claim and still become part of a propaganda process. Intent is not the only issue here.

The goal is not to make people distrust everyone. General distrust is not media literacy. The goal is to build calibrated trust and consistent standards. Who is making the claim? What do they actually know? What evidence have they provided?

And maybe that may be the correct educational sequence. First teach the method in a neutral setting. Then practice recognizing it across different political groups. Only after that ask people to examine messages coming from communities they identify with.

One very useful detail is that the researchers began with fictional and nonpolitical examples. That reduced the chance that people would immediately become defensive and turn the lesson into another partisan argument. www.science.org/doi/...

There is evidence that people can be taught to recognize these methods. Researchers have tested short educational interventions covering emotional manipulation, false dilemmas, scapegoating, incoherence and personal attacks. The interventions improved people’s ability to identify manipulation.

Is a person being reduced to a label such as traitor, scammer, agent or grifter? Are questions being treated as complicity? Are several accounts providing independent evidence, or merely repeating each other? Would I accept this standard of proof if it were used against someone I support?

Real propaganda literacy requires method recognition. What is this message asking me to feel before I examine the evidence? Is it creating urgency, outrage or fear? Is it asking me to prove loyalty by repeating an allegation? deepfakestracker.org...

This is why most media literacy remains incomplete. It often teaches enemy recognition. It teaches people which states, parties, media outlets or movements are known to manipulate information. That is useful, but it is hardly enough.

Smart people can recognize the propaganda used against them. But they can also become very skilled at explaining why propaganda that confirms their own side must be true. Critical thinking is not useful when we apply it only to people we already distrust.

Raw intelligence does not automatically protect us from this. A study on misinformation susceptibility found that myside bias, political identity and open-mindedness were more consistent predictors than analytical thinking alone.

Ten accounts repeating the same allegation are not necessarily ten sources. They may all be repeating one claim, one screenshot, one interpretation or one person’s account of events. Repetition can make a single source look like a body of evidence.

Research suggests that social cues influence judgment when people interpret them as evidence that a wider community already agrees. The audience begins to confuse visible approval with independent confirmation.

Add large followings and that creates another layer of influence. Likes, reposts and approving replies can make a claim appear socially settled before the evidence has been examined. A crowd can create the appearance of consensus.

Research on misinformation has found that people can become more susceptible when information comes from a politically similar source they already regard as credible. The combination of “one of us” and “someone I trust” is especially persuasive. www.nature.com/artic...

The claim itself is only part of the message. The messenger also carries weight. We do not evaluate every new allegation from the beginning. We often borrow trust from the person delivering it.

It may tell you that there is no time for questions. It may say that hesitation helps the enemy. It may present uncertainty as cowardice and disagreement as betrayal. It may insist that real supporters already know what is true.

Propaganda from an enemy often enough looks hostile. Propaganda from your own side can look like solidarity, urgency, vigilance or moral clarity. It may feel less like manipulation and more like proof that someone finally understands. www.cambridge.org/co...

But that assumption creates a serious weakness. Propaganda does not need to persuade you to support your opponent. It can manipulate you while repeating your values, validating your anger and presenting itself as a more committed version of what you already believe.

Most people imagine propaganda as something produced by an enemy. Russia does propaganda. MAGA does propaganda. Extremists do propaganda. Our own side merely "communicates badly", becomes "emotional" or "goes too far". www.cambridge.org/co...

But watching these accounts made me ask a larger and maybe more useful question. Can people be educated against propaganda when the propaganda appears to come from their own side?

I cannot prove who operates these accounts or what purpose they may eventually serve. My personal suspicion is that at least some are being positioned ahead of the US midterm elections. That remains a suspicion, not a proven conclusion.