Frank Kuhn

@frankkuhn

Doctoral Researcher @PRIF.org // Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control // Cold War History // Military Technology, Operations and Strategy // Opinions my own

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Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

12) Eisenhower “said he was absolutely determined not to tolerate any fooling with this thing. We had simply got to achieve such missiles as promptly as possible, if only because of the enormous psychological and political significance of ballistic missiles.”

The President said he had a final point to make to Secretary Robertson. The latter had said in the course of his presentation that henceforth the status of the DoD programs for achieving a U.S. missile capability would be reported as a normal part of the annual report of the Department of Defense on the status of the U.S. military programs. On the contrary, said the President with great warmth of feeling, the Secretary of Defense was going to report to him on the developments in these programs at least once a month. The President said he was absolutely determined not to tolerate any fooling with this thing. We had simply got to achieve such missiles as promptly as possible, if only because of the enormous psychological and political significance of ballistic missiles.

Secretary Robertson was followed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Trevor Gardner,6 who opened his presentation by expressing his appreciation of the enthusiasm which the President was showing for getting ahead with developing ballistic missiles. He then cited comparative statistics as to test firings of missiles, guided and otherwise, in the Soviet Union and in the United States in the course of the last calendar year. Of the Russian firings at least 13 were presumed to be of ballistic missiles. Secretary Gardner judged that the Soviets were probably two years ahead of us in progress toward the achievement of a ballistic missile.

After Secretary Gardner had proceeded to outline the status of the Air Force programs for the achievement of an ICBM, he was followed by Secretary Thomas, who described the joint Army-Navy program. Secretary Thomas was followed in turn by Major General Medaris, USA,7 on the program for the development of the 1500-mile so-called intermediate range ballistic missile.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

11) This study was discussed at the 268th NSC meeting on Dec. 1, 1955. Secretary Dulles emphasized “that it was of great importance that we consider carefully how to minimize the consequences of a Russian achievement of these weapons prior to the United States.”

45. Memorandum of Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, December 1, 19551

Maryland, December 1, 1955

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

[3 paragraphs (½ page of source text) not declassified]

[Here follow discussion of unrelated subjects and agenda item 2, “Assistance to Egypt in Financing the High Aswan Dam;” for text, see volume XIV, page 812.]

3. Foreign Policy Implications of U.S. and Soviet Missiles (NSC Action No. 1433–b; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 30, 1955)2

Mr. Dillon Anderson suggested that the next item, the report on the vulnerabilities of SAC, be postponed at this time in favor of Council consideration of the three items dealing with ballistic missiles. He then called on Secretary Dulles to speak to the reference report (copy filed in the Minutes of the meeting).3

After Secretary Dulles had completed his summary of the report on the foreign policy implications of a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, Secretary Wilson stated that what he deduced from Secretary Dulles’ report was that the United States should push its programs for achieving an intercontinental ballistic missile and intermediate range ballistic missile just as hard as it possibly could. Secretary Dulles agreed, but added that it was of great importance that we consider carefully how to minimize the consequences of a Russian achievement of these weapons prior to the United States. Secretary Dulles warned that it was going to be very difficult to persuade public opinion on this score. If the Soviets got either of these missiles before the United States, we could surely count on the Soviets’ dramatizing their new capability to the limit.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

10) At the end of Nov. 1955, the State report was sent to the NSC. It noted that if the Soviets were first to field an ICBM, the free world “could not help but wonder whether the U.S. willingness to act in their behalf would be reduced by the apparently greater U.S. vulnerability to nuclear attack.”

43. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

U.S. and Soviet Missiles

The Problem

1. In Action No. 1433 the National Security Council on September 8, 1955, “requested the Department of State to report to the Council, not later than December 1, 1955, on the foreign policy implications of a demonstration by the USSR that it had developed an intercontinental or a 1500-mile ballistic missile prior to the U.S. and an estimate of the extent to which U.S. achievement of a 1500-mile missile would counter the implications of a Soviet achievement of an ICBM or a 1500-mile missile.”

Discussion

2. The problem, as thus posed, calls for an evaluation of four alternative contingencies:

(a) the Soviets achieve a medium-range missile ahead of the U.S.;

(b) the U.S. and the Soviets simultaneously achieve a medium-range missile;

(c) the Soviets achieve an ICBM before the U.S. achieves a medium-range missile;

(d) the U.S. achieves a medium-range missile at the same time as the Soviets achieve an ICBM.

I. Effect of a 1500-mile Missile

A. Prior Soviet Achievement

3. The Soviet leaders will wish to avoid general war, at least so long as they believe that this might involve heavy nuclear attacks upon the U.S.S.R. They would, even after developing a 1500-mile missile, not take actions which they expected greatly to increase the risk of general war. Their view of the risks that would attach to specific Bloc actions might be altered, however, since they might expect U.S. leaders to be moved to caution by the view that prior Soviet development of a medium-range missile had somewhat worsened the relative U.S. power position. The Communists might thus embark on a somewhat more aggressive policy, which could increase the danger of war through miscalculation.

4. The first reaction on the part of free-world countries to prior Soviet development of a me

II. Effect of Intercontinental Missile

A. Prior Soviet Achievement

15. The Soviet leaders would probably only initiate general war if they felt a high degree of certainty that the U.S.S.R. would not be exposed to nuclear devastation during its course. It seems unlikely that their possession of an ICBM would cause them to feel this degree of certainty. They would fear that sufficient SAC aircraft might survive a surprise attack, whether because they were dispersed or because they were already in the air, to permit the U.S. to retaliate on a very large scale against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet leaders would, therefore, probably only attempt to capitalize on free world reactions to their new capacities by a more aggressive foreign policy in so far as they thought that they could do this without precipitating a thermonuclear conflict.

16. If free world countries believed that Soviet achievement of an ICBM endangered the U.S. retaliatory capability, they would lose confidence in the U

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

9) On Nov. 10, Allen Dulles (DC) briefed the NSC on a recent Soviet nuclear test, which “appeared to be the second largest bomb exploded by the Soviets.” In an NSC meeting on Nov. 15, Lewis Strauss (AEC) suggested this “might well turn out to have been the test of a warhead on a ballistic missile.”

The Director of Central Intelligence said that further examination of the recent Soviet nuclear test10 might have some bearing on the Killian Committee Timetable problem. [2 sentences (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Strauss said that he had a somewhat different interpretation of the implications of the Soviet test than had the Director of Central Intelligence. It was Admiral Strauss’ feeling that what had occurred might well turn out to have been the test of a warhead on a ballistic missile. [1 sentence (31 words) not declassified]Moreover, continued Admiral Strauss, if the Soviets were successful in cutting the lead time for the production of a ballistic missile as rapidly as they had succeeded in cutting the lead time for the production of their recent aircraft types, the date of mid-1958 might actually be too late as marking the end of Period II of the Killian Timetable, during which the United States would enjoy a period of maximum military advantage over the Soviet Union. Admiral Strauss said he preferred to believe that the end of Period II might come as early as mid-1957.

Secretary Wilson interrupted to say that he believed that it was a safe assumption that any technological achievement of the United States would be duplicated by the Soviet Union within a period of two years. Somehow or other they seem to have “infiltrated us” to such a degree.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

7) During the 258th NSC meeting on this item, Herbert Hoover Jr. (U/S) said that if “the Soviets were to demonstrate to the world that they actually had an ICBM before we had such a weapon, the result would have the most devastating effect on the Foreign Relations of the United States [...].“

Secretary Hoover said that he had one comment to make at this point. He explained that he was speaking as an individual with an engineering background, and that he was addressing himself to the problem of the ICBM in the context of our Foreign Relations. If the Soviets were to demonstrate to the world that they actually had an ICBM before we had such a weapon, the result would have the most devastating effect on the Foreign Relations of the United States of anything that could possibly happen. Secretary Hoover pointed out that the Western coalition was held together essentially by the knowledge of the members of the coalition of the ability of the United States to protect them. If this umbrella of protection were removed, neutralism would advance tremendously throughout the free world. From a developmental point of view, continued Secretary Hoover, we in the
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State Department view the ICBM project as in very much the same category as the Manhattan Project during World War II. All possible avenues to success would be tried, and we should not confine ourselves only to those which seemed most likely to produce results. In the State Department it was understood that there were some 180 projects in the Defense Department in the category of “highest priority”. The State Department believed that the ICBM project should be at the very top of this priority, even if to put it there inevitably meant going down certain unproductive avenues. Accordingly, it seemed to Secretary Hoover that the difference between the phrases “all practicable speed” and “all possible speed” was not a mere verbal difference, but constituted the very essence of the problem.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

6) He also pointed out that while the ICBM was already ranked as “highest priority“ in the Department of Defense, this also applied to 180 other projects.

In the Defense Department the ICBM program is already rated as “highest priority”. About 180 other projects, however, are said to enjoy this same rating. Moreover, it is understood that, even with this rating, the ICBM program has been seriously delayed by the existing procedures for clearance and approval. It has been estimated that as much as a year or more could be saved by cutting through some of this procedural routine.

To draft an NSC action which will have this effect is difficult. The Planning Board was told that the Secretary of Defense has the authority to short cut the routine procedures. Doubtless to do so will entail certain risks of waste of funds and effort. In view of the stakes involved, it appears that these risks should be taken.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

2) President Eisenhower wasn´t fully convinced of the ICBM. In an Aug. 4 NSC meeting, he said that “if the Russians can fire 1000 a day at us and we can fire 1000 a day at them, then he personally would want to take off for the Argentine.”

General Twining pointed out that we may not always have our overseas bases to launch the 1500-mile missile. Governor Stassen nevertheless thought that there should be another project on the 1500-mile missile if we assume our bases are available. On such an important matter Governor Stassen felt we needed to bet on two or three possibilities.

The President said he agreed in general with Governor Stassen’s point. However, if the Russians can fire 1000 a day at us and we can fire 1000 a day at them, then he personally would want to take off for the Argentine. Governor Stassen commented that we still need them in order to keep the Russians from starting to use them against us. The President agreed that we do need some of these missiles as a threat and a deterrent; but we don’t want to produce them in quantity because we can’t fight that kind of a war.

Secretary Dulles said that we don’t want to put all our eggs in the 1500-mile basket because our bases are doubtful. [1 sentence (23 words) not declassified]

Secretary Wilson said that he was worried about the number of new projects we have already. Once they get started, we can’t stop. Congress will always vote for new stuff (such as opposing the reduction of Marine strength), but it will never eliminate old projects or provide the taxes to pay for new ones.

Governor Stassen thought that the decision made earlier on the 1500-mile missile was now shown to be wrong. General Twining pointed out that availability of bases had been an important element in that decision. Secretary Wilson said that big rockets cost twice as much or more than a plane, and can only be used once.

The President agreed to the December 1st reporting date on the 1500-mile missile

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· 6d

1) The whole discussion started with the publication of the Killian Report in Feb. 1955, which argued that the ICBM “can profoundly affect the military posture of either country” and recommended that the NSC recognize the Air Force ICBM program as “a nationally suported effort of highest priority.”

Part II

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. General Recommendations

We recommend that:

1.
After review by the President and the National Security Council of the “Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia,” consideration be given to the recommendation in this timetable that an intensive study be undertaken to determine what diplomatic and political policies will be most appropriate during Period II to turn it to our best advantage and to the advantage of the free world. (See pages 10 through 13, Part I.)3
2.
The National Security Council formally recognize the present Air Force program for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nationally suported effort of highest priority.
3.
Actions be taken to permit the present unacceptable ground vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command to be reduced more rapidly. We recommend, further, that the emergency measures, discussed on page 68 of Part III,4 be carefully examined by the National Security Council in relation to the immediacy of the threat.
4.
The National Security Council examine the specific recommendations we have made for strengthening our continental defenses with a view to incorporating them in an early revision of NSC 5408.5
5.
The National Security Council examine the technical, procedural and personal links by which early warnings are translated into responsive national action. We recommend, further, that a mechanism be established within the Executive Office of the President for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of readiness tests.
6.
The National Security Council establish policies and take actions which will permit the full exploitation of the intelligence and other advantages which can be made available to us through the establishment of stations on the polar pack ice, particularly on the Eurasian rim.
7.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jul 2

“While the bulk of the strike forces of the Strategic Air Command are deployed in the United States, portions of these forces utilize overseas bases to provide dispersal and quick reaction capability, thus complicating the problem of enemy planners.” 4/4

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jul 2

“In the Strategic Air Command, the present overseas base system permits the dispersed deployment of medium bomber strike forces with a quick reaction time, as well as effective deployment of tanker units in support of the medium and heavy bomber fleets.” 3/4

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jul 2

“The present system of U.S. military facilities abroad is essential to an effective fulfillment of our basic national strategy. It provides a basis of support and dispersal necessary for the retaliatory forces of the Strategic Air Command.” 2/4

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jul 2

I am sure the French would be insulted by this, but “Forward Deterrence” really sounds A LOT like U.S. Strategic Air Command used overseas military bases in the 1950s and early 1960s, when it still operated a lot of medium bombers like the B-47 that had a rather limited combat radius. 🧵 1/4

Review of United States Overseas Military Bases, April 1960

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jul 1

A. Bickel on the Atoms for Peace speech: “Our real position is that we want to continue the atomic armaments race. [...] The line of attack I have just outlined is, unfortunately, supportable by reference to some of the more eloquent passages in the President’s speech of December 8, [...].”

Memorandum by Alexander Bickel of the Policy Planning Staff to the Consultant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)
secret
[Washington,] April 29, 1954.

Russian Note of April 27

It seems to me that from the point of view of public reaction, the most damaging point made by the Russian note is this: The Russians say in substance that we talked big in public before the U.N., emphasized the perils of the atomic age and suggested that we desired to meet them and were prepared to come forward with a new approach to them, but, when it came to private talks, we revealed our real position which is quite different. Our real position is that we want to continue the atomic armaments race. All our vaunted new approach turned out to be was a piddling proposal for an insignificant international pool. This shows our bad faith.

The line of attack I have just outlined is, unfortunately, supportable by reference to some of the more eloquent passages in the President’s speech of December 8, compared with which the paper we actually handed the Russians looks sick.

The fact that we are open to this damaging line of attack argues that we ought to do everything we can to preserve secrecy about these bilateral dealings. Should we, however, fail, it is imperative that we attempt to make an answer to this point. Our answer might be as follows:

The President’s speech correctly stated this country’s position. We realize the dangers of the atomic period and would like to mitigate them, if this can be done without prejudice to our security. But, experience has taught us the difficulties. We tried to negotiate disarmament before. So we thought perhaps a gradual approach might ease matters. That was the central idea of the President’s speech. We have acted on that idea, and presented the rudiments of a plan to get started. We have no panaceas, no total immediate
[Page 1403]
solution, and the President promised none. We hoped that if the Russians would in good faith join wi…

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jun 4

The concept of the stability-instability paradox, appearing in NIE 100-5-55: “Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World.”

As its nuclear capabilities grow, the USSR will have a greatly increased capability' to inflict destruction, particularly on the US itself. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders will probably still not be confident that they could attack the US with nuclear weapons without exposing the USSR to an even more devastating counterblow. We believe, therefore, that the USSR will continue to try to avoid substantial risks of general war despite the increase of its nuclear capabilities. However, as these capabilities gr.ow, Soviet leaders . may come to estimate that the US, because of fear for itself or for its allies, or because of pressure by its allies, will be increasingly deterred from initiating full-scale nuclear war. They may therefore come to believe that local wars will be less likely than at present to expand into general war, and thus tllat superior Bloc military capabilities in certain local areas can be exercised without substantial .risk of provoking general war.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jun 2

21 years before NATO's double-track decision, NIE 100-58 anticipated some of the controversies: “The IRBM issue may become a symbol which will divide those people who seek early negotiations from those whose principal concern is to maximize the military strength of the alliance before negotiating.”

In general, we believe that the US will encounter increasing trouble in retaining overseas bases on terms assuring their availability and effectiveness in case of need. In particular, the US may well encounter new problems over the next few years in its attempts to increase allied military strength through the establishment of missile bases or the further deployment of nuclear weapons overseas. Although our Western European allies have agreed in principle to the installation of IRBMs, some of them will refuse to accept them in their own countries, and others—believing that the US considers their establishment crucial to its own defense for a period of time—may attempt to exact a stiff price for accepting them. These difficulties will be especially serious in those countries where it is believed that establishment of such bases would substantially increase the likelihood of Soviet attack in case of war, would make disengagement impossible if international tension increased, or would hinder negotiation with the USSR to settle outstanding issues. The IRBM issue may become a symbol which will divide those people who seek early negotiations from those whose principal concern is to maximize the military strength of the alliance before negotiating. The issue will certainly offer opportunities for exploitation by the USSR in both Europe and the Asian-African world and for maneuvers designed to delay the installation of IRBMs. 39. Beyond these considerations the dual control provisions of the IRBM agreements will introduce new elements into the operation of the NATO alliance. On the one hand, these provisions may stimulate closer coordination of political decisions affecting East-West relations—a process which may be used to influence the US toward adopting positions agreeable to its European partners. On the other hand, joint decision may lead to hesitation in major crises, with consequent slowing and weakening of Western response

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Jun 2

“I cannot believe we would invoke world holocaust for our allies; if we say we will our allies will not believe us, and Russia will soon prove the threat an idle one.” U.S. National Security Advisor Robert L. Cutler to President Eisenhower, 1957, DDRS204903.

INCREASING RELIANCE UPON DETERRENT CAPABILITIES
1. Current talk of relying upon our deterrent powers and asking our
allies to do the same has dangerous implications and calls for close exami-
nation of deterrents. To deter, one must convince the opponert that one can
and one will make his venture unprofitable. Failure to convince on either
point destroys the deterrent, and may convert it to a stimulant.
2. Our can, in terms of SAC, carriers, missile submarines, etc., is
quite convincing. Our will is not. This fact is responsibie for much of the
present trouble and confusion. What will move the President to push the big
button that means annihilation of tens of millions in Russia, perhaps as many
or more in the U. S., the destruction of industry and cities of both countries, -
perhaps pollution of the world? No one knows, but I suspect that only direct
threats to our own or enemy national survival - and in terms of direct attack
upon the homelands - will lead either side to this extremity.
3. If we expect our allies to depend upon our deterrent power, we must
clarify this point, first for ourselves, then for our allies. This memorandum
deals only with the latter. If we use our deterrent (as we now think of it) to
protect all allies, we must promise to invoke world holocaust whenever they
are threatened. This is the reason I am appalled to hear high Government
officials propose that we fight no more local wars, but depend entirely upon
our big deterrent.
4. I cannot believe we would invoke world holocaust for our allies; if we
say we will our allies will not believe us, and Russia will soon prove the
threat an idle one.
5. I have no easy solution, but do feel instinctively that a return to
Teddy Roosevelt methods would be helpful. I would like to see the President
make a clear and credible statement to the effect that Russian aggression any-
where against any ally will be countered by any appropriate means available,
including tactical atomic weapons, if suitable:

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 26

(8) The CIA did not think Soviet deployments of ICBMs on the seabed would be very likely. In particular, “the commitment to a variety of land-based missile systems and to the new missile submarine program suggests that Soviet leaders view these systems as the most fruitful lines to pursue.”

The CIA did not think Soviet deployments of ICBMs on the seabed would be very likely. In particular, “the commitment to a variety of land-based missile systems and to the new missile submarine program suggest that Soviet leaders view these systems as the most fruitful lines to pursue.”

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 26

(6) The CIA envisioned major limitations, assessing that “any such system […] would probably be limited to encapsulated missiles or possibly a simple type of missile launching vehicle, and would almost certainly be limited in deployment to shallow (i.e., down to about 700 feet), ice-free waters.”

The CIA envisioned major limitations, assessing that “any such system […] would probably be limited to encapsulated missiles or possibly a simple type of missile launching vehicle, and would almost certainly be limited in deployment to shallow (i.e., down to about 700 feet), ice-free waters.”

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 26

(4) The CIA thought that at least for the Soviet Union, the strategic advantage of emplacing ICBMs on the seabed would be doubtful: “Given the present and foreseeable strategic situation, such an improvement for the USSR would require a large-scale program involving several hundred weapons.”

The CIA thought that at least for the Soviet Union, the strategic advantage of emplacing ICBMs on the seabed would be doubtful: “Given the present and foreseeable strategic situation, such an improvement for the USSR would require a large-scale program involving several hundred weapons.”

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 26

(3) While the “deployment of a small number [of missiles] might escape detection for some time after they became operational,” any large-scale deployment under the open ocean “would be detected before a large number of missiles became operational.”

While the “deployment of a small number [of missiles] might escape detection for some time after they became operational,” any large-scale deployment under the open ocean “would be detected before a large number of missiles became operational.”

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 26

(2) The CIA assessed that “it would be difficult for us to identify a seabed weapon system as such prior to deployment. Detection of redeployment activity, however, and of support systems and activities [..] would arouse our suspicions and would probably lead to eventual detection.”

The CIA assessed that “it would be difficult for us to identify a seabed weapon system as such prior to deployment. Detection of redeployment activity, however, and of support systems and activities [..] would arouse our suspicions and would probably lead to eventual detection.”

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 26

(1) In SNIE 11-12-68, the CIA was tasked to “estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor a ban on the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed […] and to estimate the likelihood of Soviet or third country deployments of such weapons, during the next 10 years or so.”

In SNIE 11-12-68, the CIA was tasked to “estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor a ban on the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed […] and to estimate the likelihood of Soviet or third country deployments of such weapons, during the next 10 years or so.”

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 26

According to a report by the German “Tagesschau” television news service, Russia is working on covertly emplacing intercontinental ballistic missiles on the seabed. How to make sense of this? A few insights from SNIE 11-12-68, published in August 1968 by the Central Intelligence Agency. 🧵

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 13

“Gen. Twining said the Air Force plans to send these aircraft in over an enemy country to search out and knock out mobile ICBMs on railroads. The President [Eisenhower] said that, if they think this, he thinks they are crazy!” 🔗 history.state.gov/historicaldo...

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 11

NSC162/2 on overseas bases (1953): “The effective use of U.S. strategic air power against the USSR will require overseas bases on foreign territory for some years to come. Such bases will continue indefinitely to be an important additional element of U.S. strategic air capability [...].”

11. Within the free world, only the United States can provide and maintain, for a period of years to come, the atomic capability to counterbalance Soviet atomic power. Thus, sufficient atomic weapons and effective means of delivery are indispensable for U.S. security. Moreover, in the face of Soviet atomic power, defense of the continental United States becomes vital to effective security: to protect our striking force, our mobilization base, and our people. Such atomic capability is also a major contribution to the security of our allies, as well as of this country.

12. The United States cannot, however, meet its defense needs, even at exorbitant cost, without the support of allies.

a. The effective use of U.S. strategic air power against the USSR will require overseas bases on foreign territory for some years to come. Such bases will continue indefinitely to be an important additional element of U.S. strategic air capability and to be essential to the conduct of the military operations on the Eurasian continent in case of general war. The availability of such bases and their use by the United States in case of need will depend, in most cases, on the consent and cooperation of the nations where they are located. Such nations will assume the risks entailed only if convinced that their own security will thereby be best served.

b. The United States needs to have aligned on its side in the world struggle, in peace and in war, the armed forces and economic resources and materials of the major highly-industrialized non-communist states. Progressive loss to the Soviet bloc of these states would so isolate the United States and alter the world balance as to endanger the capacity of the United States to win in the event of general war or to maintain an adequate defense without undermining its fundamental institutions.

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 3

Das Multi-Domain Command Europe wird wohl nach aktuellem Stand bestehen bleiben und gewissermaßen auf Arbeitsebene weiterhin seiner Aufgabe nachgehen: Der Integration von kinetischer und nicht-kinetischer Feuerkraft in Europa. 5/ 🔗 www.mdce.army.mil/Multi-Domain...

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· May 3

Ja, der Long-Range Fires Battalion mit Tomahawk, SM-6 und Dark Eagle wird jetzt nicht temporär in Deutschland stationiert, sondern verbleibt ganz in den USA. Das bedeutet aber doch nicht, dass wir in Europa gar keine Fähigkeiten für Deep Precision Strike haben! 2/ 🔗 www.iiss.org/research-pap...

Table 1: Selected European NATO members’ conventional deep precision strike weapons
Country Equipment Classification Estimated range
(kilometres)
Warhead
(kilograms)
Platform In service
Estonia MGM-168 ATACMS SRBM 300 227 M142 HIMARS MLRS 2025
Finland AGM-158A JASSM LACM
(subsonic)
370+ 454 F/A-18C/D Hornet fighter aircraft 2017
France SCALP EG LACM
(subsonic)
600 450 Mirage 2000D, Rafale fighter aircraft 2004
France MdCN LACM
(subsonic)
1,000+ 500 Aquitaine-class FREMM frigate, Suffren-class
nuclear-powered attack submarine
2008
Germany Taurus KEPD 350 LACM
(subsonic)
600+ 481 Tornado interdictor/strike, integration into
Eurofighter fighter aircraft ongoing
2006
Greece SCALP EG LACM
(subsonic)
600 450 Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft, Rafale fighter aircraft 2007
Italy Storm Shadow LACM
(subsonic)
600 450 Tornado interdictor/strike, Typhoon fighter aircraft 2007
Norway JSM LACM
(subsonic)
560+ 100 F-35A Lightning II fighter aircraft 2025
Poland AGM-158A JASSM LACM
(subsonic)
370+ 454 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon fighter aircraft 2017
Poland AGM-158B JASSM-ER LACM
(subsonic)
930+ 454 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon fighter aircraft 2023
Poland MGM-168 ATACMS SRBM 300 227 M142 HIMARS MLRS 2023
Romania MGM-168 ATACMS SRBM 300 227 M142 HIMARS MLRS 2022
Spain Taurus KEPD 350 LACM
(subsonic)
600+ 481 F/A-18A Hornet fighter aircraft, integration into
Eurofighter fighter aircraft ongoing
2008
Turkiye Bora SRBM 280+ 470 MBRL c. 2019
Turkiye J-600T Yildirim SRBM 150–300 Unknown F-600T TEL From 2007
Turkiye SOM-A/B1/B2 LACM
(subsonic)
250+ c. 230 F-4E Phantom 2020 fighter aircraft, F-16C/D Fighting
Falcon fighter aircraft
2011
Turkiye Tayfun Block I SRBM 560+ Unknown Ground-launched from
a mobile platform
After 2023
UK Storm Shadow LACM
(subsonic)
600 450 Typhoon fighter aircraft 2002
UK UGM-109E Tomahawk LACM
(subsonic)
1,600+ 454 Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine 1998

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Mar 19

Happy to share that I've started my stay as a visiting fellow in the Department of War Studies at the Swedish Defense University @forsvarshogskolan.bsky.social this week! Looking forward to engaging with the academic staff, attending FHS events, and presenting my work over the next three months. 🇸🇪

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Mar 4

There is also a report from FRS about the potential benefits of dispersal: www.frstrategie.org/web/document...

Frank Kuhn@frankkuhn· Feb 19

“But two important variables in the formula of the need for a European nuclear force have changed since the Cold War […] Russia’s power base, and thus the threat it could pose to Western Europe, if turned hostile, is thus significantly reduced.”