Political Psychology

@ispp-pops

Political Psychology is a peer-reviewed academic journal published by ISPP (@polpsyispp.bsky.social) co-EiC: @lizsuhay.bsky.social & @mjbsp.bsky.social Follow us everywhere & current issue: linktr.ee/POPSjournal

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Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 10h

The origins of political preferences are likely endless, but Fluit et al. present new findings for mental health's role in preference development. They link adolescent mental health & midlife behavior, with externalizing problems tied to rightward beliefs & internalizing, left. More: buff.ly/IjkyldB

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 2d

Is feeling blue the only thing making us want to go green? Sapin et al. begin charting out varying emotions about the environment & different political stakeholders. Read more for how feelings like anger & hope drive climate action & map onto stakeholders like institutions & NGOs: buff.ly/wgmXcMs

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 5d

Can reinforcing identity counter the forward march of democracy? Sumaktoyo & Soedirgo find that hardliner identity groups—but not moderate ones—tend to promote victimized majority narratives & hardliner identity is associated with more anti-democratic attitudes. Open-access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 6d

Maybe the real treasure was the [leadership skills] we made along the way. In studying prejudice reduction, Blaylock et al. find that intergroup contact not only improves out-group relations, but is also associated with greater self-esteem & civic engagement. Read more open-access: buff.ly/n4Tm5bF

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 7d

In their article, Kende et al. seek to answer the question "When do people challenge economic inequality & when are they more likely to accept it?" They find strength of local social movements interacts with local levels of inequality & predict individuals' justification. Read more: buff.ly/AoitqH6

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 8d

What mechanisms are at play in the decision to vaccinate? Beylat et al. examine perceptions of risk & trustworthiness to find out. Their findings reveal that perceived government integrity or high risk perception are individually enough to predict who gets vaccinated. Read more: buff.ly/LIcvrRw

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 9d

How closely is identity threat tied to one's values & political attitudes? Kuehnhanss & Scharfbillig find a tight connection surveying citizens across all 27 EU member states. Read the full piece open-access for more on identity threat and weaker liberal policy support: buff.ly/YW0LC64

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· 10d

August is here and so is the new issue of Political Psychology. We've got articles on everything from prejudice reduction to polarization to populism. We'll be spotlighting every article, but you can check the whole issue out online now: buff.ly/uOet23U

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· May 18

When it comes to public opinion is "What do you think?" better explained by "Do you think?" Tappin & McKay study when opinions are shaped by information, effortful thinking, & party cues. Read for how information minimizes the party effect & the questions to keep thinking on: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 4: Separate party cue and policy information effects at baseline.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· May 13

Can cross-cutting beliefs help dial down polarization? Sander & Degner examine the effects that counterstereotypes (eg, a pro-gun control Republican) have on how partisans view and categorize those opinions. Read open-access for more on their experiments: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Example of the typicality manipulation. The figure shows the last three responses of an example transcript in which the Republican target guest (black boxes) expresses either a stereotype‐disconfirming (upper panel) or stereotype‐confirming (lower panel) opinion on the target issue (affirmative action). The full transcript is available in Supporting Information S3.

Figure 2: Mean categorization scores for Experiment 1. A categorization score of 100 indicates that the person with the target opinion is perceived as definitely belonging to the category associated with that opinion, while a score of 50 indicates they are seen as equally likely to belong to either category. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· May 12

We know psychological factors & partisan identity both contribute to conspiracy beliefs, but when & how do they work together? Yair et al. study this interaction on political & nonpolitical conspiracies, finding an interaction effect only on the former. Read open-access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Partisan conspiracy theories – The interaction coefficients. Point estimates are shown, based on the regression results in Tables 1 and 2 and the meta‐analysis, with whiskers representing 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2: Non‐partisan conspiracy theories – The interaction coefficients. Point estimates are shown, based on the regression results in Table 3 and the meta‐analysis, with whiskers representing 95% confidence intervals.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· May 4

Anyone can say "can't we all just get along?" but *how* is another question. Moritz et al. study the use of metacognitive training (MCT) to reduce hostilities between two polarized voter groups in Germany, with measurable results on both sides of the divide. Read open access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Change in political hostility scores. Improvement in attitude measured as pre–post difference score.

Figure 2: Change in appraisal of antidemocratic attitude over time.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Apr 21

Lions, Tigers, and... Futbol? Oh my! From our April issue, Singh et al. try to isolate the effects of emotion on citizens' satisfaction with democracy through reactions to cultural phenomena like watching The Lion King or experiencing a win/loss for your favorite team. Read online: buff.ly/ifYLPcL

Figure 1: (A) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to geographic region. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies for location and covariates. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1407. (B) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies capturing team support and covariates. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1410. (C) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team and level of concern. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies capturing team support interacted with level of concern about the game's outcome, and covariates. “Weak” indicates a respondent scoring 0 on the 0–10 level of concern measure; “Strong” indicates a score of 10. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1408.

Figure 4: Changes in SWD from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team and level of concern. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in SWD on dummies capturing team support interacted with level of concern about the game's outcome, and covariates. “Weak” indicates a respondent scoring 0 on the 0–10 level of concern measure; “Strong” indicates a score of 10. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1408.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Apr 14

When does national victimhood "expire"? Główczewski et al. study the psychology behind Polish and Greek citizens' support for WWII reparations from Germany. Read their piece from our April issue for their findings on what we can learn when calls for restitution surface doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Indirect effect of national narcissism on support for claiming war reparations from Germany via collective victimhood (Study 1). ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effect is reported in brackets. The pattern of results remained similar when we controlled for national identification, political orientation, and assessment of Polish‐German relations.

Figure 2: Indirect effect of national narcissism on support for claiming war reparations from Germany via collective victimhood (Study 2). **p < .01. ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effect is reported in brackets.

Figure 3: Tested the structural dual‐mediator model (Study 3b). **p < .01. ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effects are reported in brackets.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Apr 10

EXTRA! EXTRA! The April issue of Political Psychology is hot off the press! With over 40 amazing articles in this issue, we'll be highlighting each in batches. Check out the classifieds here for the first set we're promoting or check out the full issue online: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14679221...

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 31

If politics is a party game then why is loneliness on the rise? And what does the loneliness epidemic mean for political attitudes? Langenkamp et al. find a connection between loneliness and heightened perception of threats & conflict in society. Read open-access for more: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Confirmatory factor analysis of social tension. RMSEA = .067, CFI = .978, TLI = .958, χ2 = 1557.347, n = 31,476 (this model was estimated with all available observations, before listwise deletion).

Figure 2: Multilevel regression of perceived social tension. Dots indicate the point estimate, lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Random slopes of loneliness by country. The random slope estimates were added to the fixed coefficient of loneliness to estimate the total effect of loneliness. The lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 26

Strange bedfellows? Maybe not. The various ideologies observed participating in violent protests may seem incompatible at first glance, but Frenken & Imhoff in our February issue find commonalities that paint a clearer picture of support for violent protests. Open-access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 2: Means and 95% CI of the variables support for general protest, support for illegal protests, and anger across classes (Study 1, similar pattern in the other studies).

Figure 3: Interaction effect between spirituality and authoritarianism (note 95% CI).

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 23

Are economic attitudes based on status as direct as we often assume? Burns & Ray find that economic conservatism & welfare policy support is more complicated than high status = high conservative attitudes. Read for more on how the middle class throws a curveball to linear assumptions buff.ly/lgtxaWK

Figure 1: Curvilinear effects of objective SES on economic inequality beliefs (Panel A), government assistance (Panel B), help for needy beliefs (Panel C), and beliefs about poor people (Panel D), Study 1. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects, and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects.

Figure 2: Linear and curvilinear effects of SES on economic conservatism (Panel A) and welfare support (Panel B), Study 3. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects. Shaded bands represent Standard Errors for point estimates.

Figure 3: Linear and curvilinear effects of SES on economic conservatism (Panel A), welfare support (Panel B), and intolerance of inequality (Panel C), Study 4. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects, and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects. Shaded bands represent Standard Errors for point estimates.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 19

The UK may have left the EU, but the two sides of the #Brexit debate are still PO'd. Phillips & Stoeckel explore the lingering animus Remainers & Leavers have toward each other & how those feelings manifest in political bias. Read their open-access article for their findings doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Distribution of Brexit group affects among the Leavers and Remainers in each sample.

Figure 3: Affective polarization and support for publication of Brexit in‐group and Brexit out‐group criticism. See Tables A2 and A22 in the Supplementary Material for full models.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 18

Protect the dolls AND have it all? Galván-Hernández et al. study feminist support for Spain's Trans Law. They find that win-win messaging bolsters support among feminist women, while conflict narratives increase zero-sum beliefs. Read the full piece open-access for more: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Perceived threat theoretical model. In dotted lines, theoretical constructs; in regular lines, empirical variables tested in our studies.

Figure 2: Timeline of the studies in relation to the approval of the trans law in Spain. Italic = final decision around the specific proposal.

Figure 3: Conditional effects of feminist identification on pro‐trans and collective actions moderated by perceived threat in Studies 1a (Figure A) and 1b (Figure B). Blue line = Mean level of perceived threat; Green line = −1SD below the mean (lower perceived threat); and Red line = +1SD above the mean (higher perceived threat).

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 17

To conceal or to reveal? Campbell & Williams dive into what drives the decision to share or hide one's identity as Roma. Read open-access to see the 3 motivating factors they identify in this decision & what their work could mean for ethnic & minority populations more broadly doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 16

With rising populism and affective polarization globally, are the two entwined? Stefanelli & Castanho Silva explore in their paper from our Feburary issue and find that the relationship isn't as straightforward as we might assume. Read for more on their findings doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 16

What can political angst reveal about efforts to redress past wrongs? Wenzel et al. describe 2 types of angst (collective & empathetic collective) in the Australian Indiginous Voice referendum. Read their findings & what they mean for empowering historically victimized groups doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Moderations by perceived material meaning of the effects of (A) collective angst and (B) empathetic collective angst (simple slopes with 95% confidence interval bands).

Figure 2: Latent true change models for collective angst and empathetic collective angst, with political orientation as covariate and voting intention (depicted here or actual vote) as predictor variable.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Mar 9

What can affective styles reveal about emotion's role in politics? Nielsen & Mønster suggest pushing beyond the Big 5 to better understand the relationship between why people "adjust, conceal, or tolerate" & social trust. More on these styles in their February article for us doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Feb 24

What effect does politician corruption have on the publics they serve? Ramos et al. explore in their paper from this month's issue. Read the full piece for their findings on corruption's toll on perceived morality & justice of society & what it means for people's well-being. doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Feb 17

Is narcissism bad for democracy? Federico et al. examine the relationship between collective narcissism and politically contrarian attitudes ("need for chaos" & "anti-establishment"). Read the full piece for their full findings and what they mean for democracy. doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Figure 1: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of national CN and IS (Study 1). Plot based on estimates in Table S2.

Figure 2: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of GN, VN, national CN, and national IS (Study 2). Plot based on estimates in Table S5.

Figure 3: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of GN, VN, national CN, and national IS (Study 3, Wave 1). Plot based on estimates in Table S8.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Jan 29

How much does extremism—independent of ideology—determine participation in collective action? Marinthe et al. present two studies in their paper from our December issue that suggest extremism could play a role in the intention to and act of participating. Full paper: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Relationship between political ideology and collective action intentions (Study 1). The shaded area represents the 95% CI.

Relationship between political ideology and collective action intentions (Study 2). The shaded area represents the 95% CI.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Jan 29

What role does authority play in people's decision to reach out to, or avoid, outgroup members? In their article from our December issue, Ditlmann & Turkoglu study how those in positions of power can dissuade or encourage intergroup contact. Read open-access for more: buff.ly/ngzqYhz

Average of contact intentions with refugees index over time. The horizontal lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Jan 27

What divides the fans who intend to boycott major sports events from the ones who follow through? Bertin & Grippa investigate calls to boycott the 2022 World Cup, finding that those who more strongly identified with fan culture tended to renege on intentions to tune out. doi.org/10.1111/pops...

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors in France, Belgium, and Canada.

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors at different levels of minority awareness among French participants.

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors at different levels of environmental awareness among French participants.

Political Psychology@ispp-pops· Jan 27

How do national identities become politically activated? From our December issue, Antonia C. May finds that the salience of immigration-related coverage in the media is connected to the activation of national identity in electoral/political cognition. Read open-access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...