Marcel Roman
@mfroman
Assistant professor of Government @ Harvard. Studies identity, race, and immigration.
Across selection-on-observables and instrumental variables designs, we find: racial segregation reduces Black GOP identity, particularly among Black conservatives; partisan segregation plays no role, race > party; effects are net of alternative explanations (knowledge, group consciousness). 6/n
We also use historic railway data merged in with our survey data to implement an instrumental variables approach and evaluate the plausibly causal effect of residential racial segregation on Black partisanship 5/n
We use two large Black surveys (N > 100k) to garner spatial variation to examine the relationship between racial segregation and Black partisanship. Our large samples allow us to adjudicate between core alternative factors explaining Black partisanship (political knowledge, group consciousness) 4\n
Although prior research (primarily Laird and White) assumes segregation is a powerful force in facilitating Black Democratic partisanship, independent theoretical and empirical assessments of the role residential segregation plays in Black partisanship are thin. 3/n
Racial segregation is still pervasive and is a technology that maintains racial inequality. On some metrics, Black residential integration with whites is just as low today as the 1960s. 2\n
🚨NEW WORKING PAPER🚨 w/ @mjstrawbridge.bsky.social and @stephanieternullo.bsky.social. We help explain the puzzle of steadfast Black identification with the Democratic party by providing new theory and evidence on the role of racial residential segregation 1/n
Third, our evidence suggests future immigrant conjoint work should evaluate theoretically motivated sources of preference heterogeneity among the public. Conclusions about the effects of attributes may not be definitive until heterogeneity is taken into account. 10/n
Second, although we find common preferences between the “global north” and “global south,” we show that we still need much more work on immigration preferences outside of Europe and North America (only 18% of observations from global south). 9/n
Why care about this paper? First, it’s a useful point of departure for understanding immigration preferences around the world. It may be useful to cite when implementing an immigration conjoint. 8/n
On the culture vs. economics debate: some conjoint evidence shows cultural considerations matter less than economic ones. This muted cultural effect may be an artifact. Countervailing preferences between anti- and pro-immigrant segments of the public cancel out in aggregate estimates. 6/n
However, preferences for high-skilled immigrants have become stronger over time, particularly among low-income host country members who may serve to benefit from economic complementarities with high-skilled workers. 5/n
Surprisingly, these immigration preferences are similar across the Global North and South; and between North America, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, despite variation in immigration policies and contexts. 4/n
What matters for immigration preferences? Evidence from 1.5 million immigration profiles shows gender, age, socio-economic considerations, migration motives, immigrant integration, and legal status all strongly shape preferences. 3/n
The conjoint experiment has become a useful tool for understanding immigration preferences around the world. We collect data on 100 conjoints fielded in the past decade to meta-analytically identify common patterns in immigration preferences 2/n
A core finding from our recent @pnas.org paper is that the people who select into law enforcement, including homeland security, have less respect for civil liberties. DHS/CBP is composed of more people who think it's okay to repress (and evidently, kill) dissenters www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/...
Re-upping our paper on why Trump was not held accountable for Jan 6. GOP public backlash to Trump post-Jan 6 was *cancelled out* among white GOP who believe white people are disadvantaged. Racial status threat is a powerful force undermining small-d democracy! www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
If you're attending WPSA 2026 @wpsa.bsky.social, consider submitting a paper to present at the WPSA Latina/o Politics Pre-Conference! See the call for papers below for details on how to submit an abstract. DM/email me or @ivyamcargile.bsky.social if you have questions!
there's an article about perceptions of "anti-white discrimination" in professional jobs being discussed. I have a paper showing these sentiments are why people excuse violent, anti-democratic behavior among politicians (e.g. Trump) tinyurl.com/2p9s42an
We find: economic migration is associated with stronger home country ties, lower socio-political integration in the host society, reduced long-term assimilation. Plausibly causal IV estimates show economic migration causes large reductions in host society socio-political integration.
We also use one of the surveys to implement a well-validated instrumental variables approach exploiting discontinuous increases in economic migration as a function of age-at-arrival.
Many immigrants are economic migrants: they come to a host society to work, but do not intend to stay long-term. We posit this generates a "myth-of-return" that maintains home country ties and undercuts socio-political investment in the host country even if economic migrants are long-term residents.
🚨NEW WORKING PAPER🚨 Why are many Latino immigrants *not* naturalizing, learning English, and participating in American politics? We provide new theory and evidence across 3 surveys and an instrumental variables approach to show how migration motives shape immigrant integration. tinyurl.com/3expvu8e
we have a paper on this, some conservative whites support abortion and contraception for non-whites, limiting abortion and promoting pro-natal policies for whites. this attitude is driven by growing non-white births. elon is tapping into attitudes many whites hold www.marcelroman.com/pdfs/wps/abo...
Our @apsrjournal.bsky.social article is now in print! We develop a theory to explain why the public doesn't become more prosocial toward LGBTQ+ people after illegitimate anti-LGBTQ+ violence and provide causal, externally valid, evidence for the theory across 4 studies doi.org/10.1017/S000...
it could be both, we don't discount the possibility of organizational socialization effects. in the appendix, based on some assumptions, we quantify the proportion of ACAB that is because AC starts as B relative to C makes B, and find selection explains 41-50% of B.
now, some police-intenders may drop out of college or end up with 2-year degrees, but we show much of the selection effect holds across these groups relative to police-intenders who are unlikely to drop out and are attending 4-year colleges
this is a really good point and we deal with it in the paper. In the 70s, there was a push to educate police and the ACS shows a precipitous increase in education among police officers. as of 2022, over 85% of police at least enroll in college...
Contrary to claims that racial diversity can mitigate biased and hierarchy-enhancing beliefs among the police, we do not find the selection effect is mitigated among non-whites, but it is mitigated among women. 7/n
Consistent with the selection mechanism, we find late adolescents who intend to be cops are consistently more right-leaning on race, immigration, multiculturalism, gender, sexuality, drug policy, free speech, criminal justice, and military policy. 6/n
🚨NEW PAPER 🚨 Are police more right-wing and biased against marginalized groups than the general public? If so, why? My new article in @pnas.org w/ @tylerreny.bsky.social, Newman, and Sears provides some answers. 🧵1/n