(I was on the Census Scientific Advisory Committee from 2012 to 2015 and was PAA president in 2015.) 2/2 doi.org/10.1215/0070...

This graph from our new paper on the invention of microdata shows the involvement of PAA presidents with the Census Bureau from 1930 to 2019. The tiny grey bar on the right of the graph represents me. 1/2

This graph from our new paper on the invention of microdata shows the involvement of PAA presidents with the Census Bureau from 1930 to 2019. The tiny grey bar on the right of the graph represents me. 1/2

Curious about the invention of microdata? Our new paper in Demography reveals the story. doi.org/10.1215/0070...

IPUMS BBQ today.

My paper on the "Pig in the Python" is now available with no paywall from NIH. I argue that the demand for young workers will grow dramatically over the coming decades, likely leading to rising wages, stronger unions, and lower inequality. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC...

I don't get the relevance of Minnesota's white population, but they put my picture in the paper today. www.startribune.com/ramstad-why-...

Like this:

Gift link: users.pop.umn.edu/~ruggl001/Ar...

The Pig is departing the Python. Gift link: users.pop.umn.edu/~ruggl001/Ar... www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/...

We just can't do anything right! First we clog the job market by existing, then we wreck it by retiring. Oh well. www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/... Email me if you need a non-paywalled copy.

Here's another mangling of my "Pig in the Python" paper. I argued that boomers departures will likely lead to higher wages and reduced inequality for the young. This person says "The generation that made it hard to find a good job for four decades is now making it hard to find workers at all."

Lichtenberg somehow transforms my optimistic argument into a dystopian catastrophe. Labor shortages are clearly a good thing from the perspective of the laborers, but I guess Fortune Magazine has a different perspective. www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/...

This article completely misinterprets my new paper on "The Pig in the Python." I argue that the the demand for young workers will grow dramatically over the coming decades, likely leading to rising wages, stronger unions, and lower inequality. /1 www.msn.com/en-us/money/...

A new article in Fortune Magazine manages to twist my optimistic interpretation of the "Pig in the Python" into a dystopian catastrophe. Labor shortages are generally a good thing, at least from the perspective of the laborers. /1 fortune.com/2026/05/25/b...

I give a more detailed description of the analysis is here: bsky.app/profile/stev...

I argue that an unprecedented demographic transformation will drastically reduce competition for jobs by 2040. Barring an economic collapse, we can expect a massive shortfall of new workers, leading to upward pressure on wages and an improved climate for labor organizing.

My new @ipums analysis of the “Pig in the Python” argues that the demand for young workers will grow dramatically over the coming decades, likely leading to rising wages, stronger unions, and lower inequality. www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/...

Fluctuations in the number of workers entering the labor force drove the dramatic swings in wages from the 1940s to the 1980s. But as the pig in the python is finally fully digested, the impact may be even greater than the boom and bust of the twentieth century. /28

We will still have the problem of funding Social Security and Medicare, but it is short term. The Baby Boomers will die off quite rapidly after 2040. /27

If there is no economic calamity, we can expect strong upward pressure on wages, more labor organizing, and reduced inequality. All this assumes, of course, that society has not collapsed by 2040. /26

One thing is clear: we are on the verge of an unprecedented demographic transformation. Predictions are tricky. Maybe AI will take all the jobs. Maybe Trump will cause a total collapse of the economy. /25

The pig in the python—the vast cohort of baby boomers, augmented by the surge of women and immigrants into the labor force—stood in the way of Easterlin’s golden age for young workers, suppressing wage growth for four decades. /24

This index is consistent with the wage trends for young workers. Workers were scarce during the upsurge in young adult wages that took place between 1940 and 1973, and competition for jobs was consistently high during the long stagnation of wages between 1973 and 2014. /23

To deal with this I propose an index of employment competition. This is calculated as the net labor market entries over the previous five decades—a period long enough to encompass most working careers—as a percentage of the working-age population in the current decade. /22

The baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. Like the pig in the python, the bulge of workers suppressed the appetite for new workers. /21

Here are the total net entries as a percentage of the population of usual working age in each period. But this is not a valid measure of labor market competition. This makes it look like the 1950s had more competition than the 1990s! That’s just wrong. /20

Add both together to describe total net decennial entries into the labor force. Big spike of 1970s resulted from baby boom plus rising participation of women. Second spike after 2000 due to immigrant workers. By the 2030s, net entry into the labor force will fall below zero. /19

Net entries, all ages: US Born and immigrant US-born peak in 1970s. Women account for most of the increase. Immigrants more likely to leave than to enter in the 1920-1960 period because of immigration restrictions. Immigrants peaked three decades later than US born. /18

Here are the net exits for immigrants. I predict rapid increase after 2030 as the bulge reaches retirement age. /17