IS THE ECONOMIST ALWAYS WRONG? Scandalously, in some circles @economist.com has a reputation as a contrarian indicator. This week we fessed up to getting a big call on oil prices wrong. But in general, how do we do? I threw LLMs at 7,000 leaders to find out: Link: www.economist.com/interactive...

If anyone fancies getting out the crayons themselves, this is a blank version of that grid.

A short follow-up post from me where I try, literally, to draw out where I think our boundaries for AI writing should be. I'd argue the two main dimensions that matter are: (a) how involved is AI, (b) is the writing mechanical or ideas-led? Read here: notes.archie-hall.com/p/drawing-th...

What might a positive world full of AI writing look like? I had a go speculating in my (otherwise v negative) piece on the issue. — Infinitely nested, constantly-updating AI summaries — To lodge an idea in the discourse, persuade AI it's new Full piece: notes.archie-hall.com/p/am-i-a-wr...

AM I A WRITING LUDDITE? New post from me about AI writing: why I think we should be ruder about it, and how I might be wrong. Read to the bottom for as clear-cut a case as I can make that the "Productive State" report was largely AI-written. notes.archie-hall.com/p/am-i-a-wr...

America could have had a gangbusters 2025... were it not for a frenzy of bad policymaking. Careful work by my colleague Alex Domash recovering the "MAGA tax" on America's economy. He puts it at 0.7-0.8% of 2025 GDP growth. www.economist.com/finance-and-...

We're not in late-1990s boom territory quite yet, but productivity is looking better than anything we've seen since (or before, at least since the 70s). Real-time data tends to be rather noisy, but there's no reason to think the boom has stopped. (AI will probably extend it.)

The BLS measure of labour productivity is running 3% of so ahead of the CBO's final pre-covid forecast. GDP, as the chart above shows, has started beating forecasts rather than being beaten by them.

A PRODUCTIVITY MIRACLE? Rich-world productivity growth was pronounced dead in the 2010s (or at least sleeping). But in America it has been decisively revived, I write in this week's @economist.com. Elsewhere in the world, rather less so. Link: www.economist.com/finance-and...

And a great piece from my colleague John Heilbron, on how the Fed may be able to use prediction-market data-- exactly the sort of Warsh-friendly alternative data that might genuinely make better policy. www.economist.com/finance-and...

Then, a deeper look from me at what the Warsh Fed reform agenda looks like. The good news: it is far more modest than the rhetoric of "regime change" suggests—balance-sheet fiddles, comms tweaks and more alternative data. But nor would it improve much. www.economist.com/finance-and...

Something of a Fed extravaganza in @economist.com this week. To start, my leader: "How Kevin Warsh could save the Federal Reserve". Warsh wasn't our chair pick. But one version of him may be just the man for this moment of political crisis for the Fed. www.economist.com/leaders/202...

Have been waiting almost two years for the right article to smuggle this fact into. (From my leader on America's misguided war on taxes: economist.com/leaders/2026...)

Trump's "Big, Beautiful Bill" tax refunds are now arriving. Democrats are putting forward proposals to zero out income tax liability for vast swathes of Americans. And zany proposals are floating around at the state level.

AMERICA'S TAX REVOLT Republicans and Democrats alike seem to be ditching the idea that most Americans ought to be paying very much in taxes at all. Increasingly, voters seem to agree. For Tax Day, I wrote about this troubling development for @economist.com. www.economist.com/united-stat...

THE CRUELLEST YEAR Twelve months after "Liberation Day", I wrote for @economist.com on American manufacturers—supposedly the trade war's winners. Even they are sceptical: chaos, instability and paperwork have swamped the tariffs' competitiveness boost. www.economist.com/united-stat...

3/ And, more spectulatively, if angst over electricity prices dials up another level, the already-shaky politics of America's data centre buildout could fray further.

2/ But the shock collides with an economy that ordinary Americans seem to hate, no matter how good thre growth numbers. One saving grace, until now, had been that gas prices were fairly low. No more. The political impacts of that shift ahead of the midterms will be sharp.

1/ The sheer scale of the boom in shale and LNG exports over the past few decades has been staggering, and is probably still under-appreciated. In aggregate, that means American growth won't be as battered as energy importers in Europe and Asia. Parts of the country will boom.

UNITED PETROSTATES I look at how the oil shock will hit the US economy in @economist.com today—one that now exports 2/3 as much energy as Saudi Arabia. Growth will still sag, and the poorest get squeezed. But America is well-positioned to weather the hit www.economist.com/finance-and...

6/ The strongest reason to be nervous is that stockmarket gains have been pretty remarkable over the past few years, and the rich hold more stocks. But: since 2019, the top 1% and the bottom 20% have actually had about-equal % increases in net worth, according to the NY Fed.

5/ Cumulatively, the poorest have seen their wages grow the most since the pandemic, though that advantage seems to have tapered off in the past year or so as the labour market has cooled.

4/ More tellingly, little else in the economy is behaving as if America has become substantially more top-heavy recently. If anything, consumer sentiment is more equal than usual. (Meaning mostly that everyone is equally glum.)

3/ Other estimates of spending differentials (here's one based on credit and debit card data from Consumer Edge) don't show big gaps.

1/ To start: does the top 10% do nearly half of spending in America, as the "K-shaped" narrative claims? That stat comes from an imputed spending estimate from Moody's, based on Fed financial flows data. A more straightforward approach—asking people—yields a much duller story.

NOT SO "K" America's "K-shaped" economy has become conventional wisdom—the idea that spending is booming for the rich and slumping for the rest, leaving growth top-heavy and precarious. Only one problem: as I write in @economist.com, it is probably wrong. 🔗: www.economist.com/finance-and...

BRITAIN'S AI BEAR CASE What happens, if AI takes off, to an economy that is... ... highly dependent on exporting professional services? ... Too energy-scarce to build many data centres? ... Less dynamic than ever? I work through those questions here: notes.archie-hall.com/p/britains-...

The impact of Trump's attacks on the IRS, in two charts. From my latest for @economist.com. www.economist.com/finance-and...

2/ But businesses are adapting, too. The inventories that were built up ahead of the tariff announcements have run down. Some might be shuffling supply chains. Lots more are mulling forms of trickery to reduce the duty they pay. Consumers are shifting away from tariffed goods.

1/ Already, we've seen the latest slate of new tariff threats (re Greenland, Korea, elsewhere) not bite: market and business tolerance seems to have peaked. And the upcoming Supreme Court decision on IEEPA tariffs may well nudge tariff rates down.