We can also present this sensitivity using the tax bases implied by Dan's revenue figures. On this basis, if non-tax factors explain more than 14% of the divergence, the revenue loss vanishes. Crucially, there is only a £22m loss if we assume tax drives 100% of the divergence.

This distinction matters because Dan accepts that his £22m revenue loss is conditional. The entire “loss” disappears if Scottish top incomes would otherwise have grown just 1.2% more slowly than rUK. A small change in the counterfactual reverses the result.

Our charts showed Scottish and rUK top incomes have repeatedly diverged historically, showing there are drivers beyond tax at play. Dan accepts this is the case, but argues the recent divergence cannot be explained by historic volatility.

Our alternative HMRC ratio - which is not impacted by the threshold change - does not show the same deterioration in 2023-24. The ratio actually increased. This doesn't disprove Dan’s hypothesis, but it shows it’s sensitive to measurement.

To support his tax hypothesis, Dan highlights a decline in Scotland’s ratio of average top income to rUK as a sign of behavioural change. However, the threshold fell from £150,000 to £125,140 in 2023-24, increasing the number of taxpayers in the top band – but not consistently.

This is little more than sleight of hand dressed up as economics. If Dan wants to defend the £22m figure, he needs to explain what drove Scotland’s historic divergence, and why it's not relevant. Those non-tax factors can't simply be wished away to make the tax hypothesis fit.

Using UK growth to predict Scotland in the past would have produced large forecasting errors. This matters because Dan’s £22m estimate depends on one-year exact matching. The historical relationship shows this is highly questionable.

An alternative HMRC dataset, using a fixed £150,000 threshold back to 2010-11, shows the same point. Growth of high-incomes in Scotland is far more volatile than the UK's – including long before Scotland diverged on income tax.

Dan's own data show that the growth in Scottish top incomes has historically differed sharply from rUK. Scottish trends are far more volatile. The key assumption driving the £22m “loss” is therefore empirically weak. This alone should be enough to make us extremely cautious.

🚨 NEW: @danneidle.bsky.social claims Scotland’s 48% tax rate has lost public revenue. But is this actually true? My new deep-dive says no – Dan’s analysis doesn’t prove anything. It’s a long read, so buckle up 🧵

Average incomes can conceal how growth is distributed. Among all UK regions and nations, Scotland has the lowest proportion of workers earning below the Living Wage. This has been aided by deliberate policy choices, including Scotland's Fair Work agenda.

Scotland has also outperformed most of the UK on household disposable income, which includes earnings and benefits, net of taxes. Real GDHI per head has grown faster than in every English region except London.

But what matters most is living standards. Since devolution, median weekly earnings have risen by 23% in Scotland, versus 15% in England, 16% in Wales and 20% in Northern Ireland. Scotland has overtaken England and now has the highest earnings of all UK nations.

Since 1999, Scotland has recorded the fastest GDP growth per capita of any UK nation. Edinburgh now has the highest GDP per capita of any UK city. Productivity tells a similar story. Since the financial crisis, Scotland's productivity has grown at roughly twice the UK's rate.

NEW: Has devolution helped or hindered Scotland's economy? 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 Critics claim it has failed. I dug into more than two decades of data to test that claim (it's wrong), and identify lessons England. 🧵

Three of the UK’s nations have elected pro-independence parties. The fourth is drifting towards English nationalism under Reform. These islands are constitutionally broken. Yet the UK government still acts like it’s 1997.

Proponents of tax cuts claim this will supercharge growth, but this is dubious. Scotland had lower income tax until relatively recently, and growth was equally poor. The UK still has lower tax rates today, and is hardly booming.

Similarly, the Conservatives are proposing nearly £3bn of income tax cuts, which would predominantly benefit higher earners, alongside £700m cuts to business rates. This is would be enabled by slashing welfare and cutting public spending.

Reform are proposing ~£4bn of income tax cuts, which would benefit high earners the most. In practice, these tax cuts would necessitate deep cuts to public spending, amounting to a radical shrinking of the state.

Malcolm Offord says he’s a very wealthy man. So what would Reform’s tax cuts mean for him? Even on an MSP salary alone, he’d sit in the top income decile — and benefit significantly.

NEW: How do party election manifestos measure up on delivering a just transition? Today we’re publishing @futureeconscot.bsky.social's deep dive into each party’s policy platform. 🧵 👉 www.futureeconomy.scot/publications...

Landlords simply raised rents sharply between tenancies. New tenants faced huge jumps, and advertised rents soared. Overall market rents kept rising — sometimes faster than rUK without rent controls.

Crucially, VAT revenue to the state is treated as a simple, static gain. But the "losses" are multiplied across the whole economy, projected 15 years into the future, and compounded. When you multiply the "bad" and minimise the "good," it’s unsurprising you get the answer you want.

In any case, the number of school-age children in Scotland overall is expected to fall by 17% over the same period. Much of any decline that happens will be demographics, not VAT. The report acknowledges this, but underplays it.

Future “losses” to the state assume private school pupils shrink by a third over the next 15 years, which is largely attributed to the VAT change. This means less public revenue from taxes, and higher “costs” for state schools, as above.

The study claims private schools have already seen a 9% drop in pupils due to VAT. One problem: that drop mostly happened before the policy even started in 2025.

The cost of living is a top issue for voters, and rightly so. Over the past 5 years, the price of essentials has risen more than 2x faster than wages. Olive oil? Nearly 4x faster.

What’s driving this? Weak wage growth is part of the story, but there’s another culprit: inflation. But headline figures masks huge variation. The cost of some everyday essentials has risen more than twice as fast as wages over the 5 years.

It’s not just earnings. Real disposable income per person – what people actually have to spend – has also stalled: 📈 Early devolution: +2.6% per year ⚠️ Since 2008: just +0.3% And the forecasts don't look much better.

The cost of living is a top concern among voters, and it’s obvious why. The numbers are stark: 📈 Pre-2008: wages grew 2.2% per year ⚠️ Since 2008: just 0.14% per year Annual pay grew 15x faster before the financial crisis than after it.