I was delighted to be asked by COVID-ACTION to give them a talk. Initially we hadn't selected a topic for the talk, but the effrontery of a NERVTAG member (purporting that the pandemic planners had done a great job!) soon settled the subject in my mind. tinyurl.com/Pandemic-Pla...

Appendix 1 (name and shame…) is worth a glance. Note the few who resisted HSE’s insistence not to report and did the right thing (legally, morally, ethically) e.g. Maidstone, East Kent & Betsi Cadwaladr which reported hundreds of healthcare worker COVID infections. The others didn't... 14/19

I would particularly draw attention to section 9.1 (summary). It will particularly be of interest to HCWs harmed by COVID-19. 13/19

The letter to HSE explains exactly how RIDDOR should, by law, have been applied to HCW infections. I will have to leave it to those who are interested to read that letter. tinyurl.com/Ltr-to-HSE-R... 12/19

Good sense would be for HSE to specify diseases caused by pathogens that are classified as hazard group 3 or 4 by the ACDP committee. But I no longer like to link “HSE” and “good sense” in the same sentence. The respect I once had for that organisation evaporated over the past 6 years. 6/19

Regulation 9(b) of RIDDOR requires employers to report a case of disease caused by the employee being exposed to a biological agent (virus, bacterium etc). The proposed changes relate to extending ‘diagnosis’ and adding more specified diseases into reg'n 8. No changes are proposed to Reg 9. 3/19

There's a lot to digest in the Module 3 report - section 2.98 particularly indigestible! If tou have not already seen them, you should read the reports of our (CATA's) two independent investigations, links to which can be found at the end of our March Press Release: tinyurl.com/CATA-press-r...

The Inquiry recognised that reporting of HCW deaths under the RIDDOR Regulations for reporting occupational disease should be better. Sadly it didn't address the failure to report occupational infections which don’t cause deaths but leave HCWs crippled with Long-COVID. /End

Importantly though, the Inquiry recognised that ventilation is only effective against ‘far-field’ transmission, but has no impact on other transmission routes such as, for example, close quarter care of infectious patients. /22 of 23

Having accepted that ventilation is an important risk reduction measure for airborne diseases, the Inquiry took evidence from Professor Beggs concerning the benefits of installing HEPA air filters: /21 of 23

Baroness Hallett’s unequivocal recommendation is that the DHSC and relevant health authorities: /20 of 23

The Inquiry concluded: /19 of 23

AGPs: ‘DEAD IN THE WATER !’ The Inquiry considered the vexed question of Government only allowing RPE for Aerosol Generating Procedures. It has now been laid to rest – or at least it should be, unless DHSC and NHS persist in ignoring Lady Hallett’s recommendations. /18 of 23

This same issue is discussed in more detail at section 8.4 of the above-mentioned CATA report into the UK IPC Cell where Professor Mark Wilcox (NHS England IPC Director) admits the terminology can lead to ‘misperceptions’. /17 of 23

The Inquiry discussed the bizarre framing of IPC guidance issued around winter 2021/22 as to when Respiratory Protective equipment should be worn using terms like ‘wholly’ or ‘predominantly’ airborne without making a clear statement as to how each disease is spread. /16 of 23

The UK IPC Cell’s understanding of the hierarchy is covered in CATA’s own investigative report tinyurl.com/CATA-rpt-2 (section 3.4.2). At a meeting in August 2022 between 2 healthcare professionals, Mr Duncan Burton and Dr Lisa Ritchie, the following was noted: /15 of 23

The Inquiry concluded that the IPC Cell failed to understand the ‘hierarchy of risk controls’. It failed to appreciate that the elements of the hierarchy were not mutually exclusive.

The Inquiry accepted the evidence of three IPC experts which alluded to the lack of skills and bias of the UK IPC Cell. The Inquiry concluded that the UK IPC Cell did not function effectively. /13 of 23

Prof Susan Hopkins also referenced this paper in her witness statement. /12 of 23

At para 172 of her statement Dr Ritchie claimed that this paper was discussed at the IPC Cell meeting on 23 Dec 2020. It is difficult to see how this can be true when Freedom of Information data shows that the paper had not yet been written! (p.34 of above-mentioned CATA report) /11 of 23

The PHE report was not published on 23 Dec 2020 as stated (the Inquiry was misled on this matter). It was ‘buried’ by PHE senior management and only saw the light of day when adduced into evidence for the Inquiry by Dr Ritchie & Prof Susan Hopkins. tinyurl.com/PHE-Paper-23... /10 of 23

The Inquiry investigated meetings of the IPC Cell on 22/23 Dec 2020 at which Public Health England recommended wider use of FFP3s beyond AGPs. Paragraph 1.133 is untrue, as shown by CATA’s independent investigations tinyurl.com/CATA-rpt-2 (section 2.8) /9 of 23

As Dr Barry Jones, Chair of CATA, explained to the Inquiry this was to have devastating consequences throughout healthcare: /8 of 23

The UK Government and Devolved Administrations wasted no time in promulgating this misinformation throughout the four nations of the UK /7 of 23

Of course we all know of Maria van Kerkhove’s repeated assertions: “It is not airborne” “It is not airborne” “It is not airborne” “It is not airborne” tinyurl.com/Maria-not-ai... /6 of 23

The Inquiry was unequivocal in ‘calling out’ the World Health Organisation for failing to recognise the potential for airborne transmission. The Inquiry does not seem to have attempted to determine whether WHO was 'prompted' by countries which did not have enough RPE... /5 of 23

It is no coincidence that Baroness Hallett refers to IPC guidance as being ‘flawed’ – a descriptor of the guidance used no less than 9 times in CATA’s Module 3 Witness Statement. /4 of 23

Baroness Hallett (Chair), Ms Jacqueline Carey KC (Counsel to the Inquiry) and her team certainly ‘got the message’ that airborne transmission was of first and foremost importance in terms of Infection Prevention and Control in healthcare. It was chapter #1 in the report /3 of 23