Here’s just one resource you might find useful: An interactive network map showing all the Chechen units and their institutional affiliations: www.threatologist.com/rsrl/researc...

Slowly but surely, the Russian Security Research Lab (RSRL) is coming to life. I've been working on this for over a year, but most of the infrastructure is in place...

I have used both ChatGPT and Claude for a variety of business-related tasks. They can be genuinely useful, but sometimes they do things that are very worrying. Exhibit A, which came appended to an actual answer to a question I posed:

1) The quality of the response is directly linked to the quality of the input. Short prompts produce shitty responses. So whereas Jeremy asked a three-line prompt (see image), really you need at least a half page of instructions to get anything worthwhile.

Incidents were geographically more clustered in Dagestan and more dispersed in Stavropol Kray compared to 2024.

A total of 26 events were recorded in Ingushetia, 22 in Dagestan, and 27 in Stavropol Kray. Together, these three republics accounted for 71% of the regional total.

Every year, I publish an annual report based on a unique open-source incident database that I’ve compiled. One of the most significant changes this year is a drop in the number of casualties produced by incidents: between 35 and 42 compared to 82 and 122 in 2024.

And here's its faithful representation of that photo! I may be sticking with ChatGPT for this task...

Because ChatGPT has been winding me up and for many things people say Claude is better, I thought I'd give it a go. Here's the picture that I gave it:

Sometimes, what AI produces is objectively hilarious. I've been asking ChatGPT to produce illustrations from photos, according to a specified style. The output can be inconsistent and ChatGPT infuriating, but sometimes it works.

The casualty figures were much higher in 2024 than 2025, but there’s an easy explanation for that: the major attacks in Dagestan in June 2024, which distort all the figures.

The bigger picture is arguably more revealing: The volume and geographic spread of incidents for the first nine months of 2025 is almost identical to the same period of 2024.

The picture is similarly ambiguous when you look at the number of casualties caused by incidents: Here, the last quarter was much less violent than the one that came before it, but more violent than the same period last year. And overall casualty figures are low.

That, however, is offset by a factors such as interconnected incidents and a series of drone attacks (which are really political violence rather than terrorism) inflating the numbers.

Here's what the different scenarios look like when they're mapped out:

When Ramzan Kadyrov steps down as head of Chechnya, what happens? I've been playing around with visualising the different scenarios, based around two key questions: Does the Kremlin maintain control of the succession process? And do other influential actors accept a claim to power?

This is seen mostly clearly in the number of incidents classified as successful detentions: 11 in the first quarter of 2025 compared to 16 in the same period of 2024 and 18 in the last quarter of 2024.

Political violence is down in the North Caucasus for Q1 2025 compared to both Q1 2024 and Q4 2024. That’s true for both the number of terrorism-related incidents and their deadliness. But the fall is not the result of declining insurgent activity.

The answer is a clear yes: The number of casualties is similarly down – from 17 in 2024 to 8 in 2025. But does that mean all is rosy in the region?

What does terrorism in the North Caucasus look like thus far in 2025? Well, in simple terms, there has been a decline in the number of terrorism-related incidents: From 26 in Q1 2024 to 21 in Q1 2025. Is that downward trend supported by casualty figures though?

Who is Khuseyn Mezhidov, one of the Chechen commanders potentially implicated in the Bucha massacre?

If you’re going to shake someone down, make sure they’ve not got friends in high places. This, at least, is one of the lessons from the downfall of a Russian mercenary group.

What raccoons can tell us about Russia’s violent entrepreneurs. The history of ENOT Corp mirrors the evolution of Russia’s mercenaries. 🧵

Captchas just get more and more complicated...

Lady Macbeth exits stage left Ayshat Kadyrova, the daughter of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrova, has announced that she is quitting as Chechen deputy prime minister, a role she has occupied since October 2023.

I was wrong, btw: the casualty figures aren't exactly in line with population. North Ossetia is suffering much greater losses than the other federal subjects of the North Caucasus, while Chechnya and Ingushetia are relatively low. Details and discussion in Friday's newsletter.

The best* book ever written on the Caucasus Emirate’s ideology is now available for pre-order. The Caucasus Emirate: Ideology, identity and insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus (Manchester University Press) amzn.eu/d/6QrSQ3h * and only

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Where are Russian groups likely to appear in the future?

But hiring states are not always happy: