Solar eclipse, both with and without glasses, in Penarth, Wales.

In some major professional news, tomorrow I will be starting as Assistant Professor in Political Science at Trinity College Dublin! 🇮🇪 Super excited about this opportunity, and huge thanks to everyone who made this possible.

At least in 2022, Northern resentment of the South had clear political effects. It moved people away from the Tories and possibly towards Labour. Southern resentment's effects are absorbed by other attitudes. Peripheral resentment, while prevalent, does not appear politically consequential.

Just as we see in other contexts, resentment from more aggrieved regions towards less aggrieved regions is higher than the reverse. Northerners have more resentment toward the South than vice versa, as do the rest of England vs London (which even Southerners near London feel).

Most forms of place-based resentment in England represent coherent constructs, save for London resentment of elsewhere (which frankly can be down to low sample size).

We tested four forms of place-based resentment in England: Northerners' resentment of the South, Southerners' resentment of the North, the rest of England's resentment of London, and Londoners's resentment towards the rest of England.

On my way to ISPP! Looking forward to presenting on how values undergird foreign policy dispositions and on how affective polarization constrains spatial voting, as well as catching up with friends old and new.

Under King Charles, younger generations may be coming to support the monarchy less. According to @britishelectionstudy.com data, the youngest cohorts declined in support for continuing the institution once Charles succeeded Elizabeth, but older cohorts did not.

Under Queen Elizabeth, generational cohorts did not clearly or consistently differ in their support for continuing the monarchy or its abolition.

According to 40+ years of British Social Attitudes Survey data, under Queen Elizabeth, age has a strong effect on support for the monarchy. Young people start out less enthused and grow in support over time. This holds across multiple modelling strategies and controlling for other factors.

We don’t usually get to see each other’s header images. Here’s mine: it’s nothing.

The unionist loyalists are certainly behaving according to your specifications.

One time I was trying to look up the etymology of the phrase “have a good one” and the result was similar.

Yep, this tracks!

Yeah, this tracks.

@the-independent.com, why are you nodding to the anti-vaxxers with this framing? In a moment where there's a concerted effort to undermine science, any overture to COVID denialism is extremely irresponsible. The COVID vaccine saved millions of lives and was nothing short of a miracle.

In some major personal news, I am now a UK citizen! As a thanks to all who helped make this possible, I wore the Union Jack socks @jasonreifler.bsky.social gifted/the t-shirt @polpsychkent.bsky.social gave to me at my leaving do, and did the affirmation/pledge in Welsh to show my affinity for Wales.

I thought academic spam emails were supposed to be flattering!

The collective violence support scale was developed in Lebanon, but replicates among a sample of Syrian diaspora (who supported the opposition at the time) and in Turkey, showing it can be flexible to different contexts.

Despite both being rooted in trait aggression and support for non-normative collective action, support for violence against outgroup members is positively associated with system support, while support for violence against outgroup leaders is negatively related.

Both support for violence against outgroup members and outgroup leaders correlate with support for other forms of non-normative collective action and with trait aggression.

Experimentally priming feelings of threat increases endorsement of both violence against outgroup members and leaders, the overall structure of attitudes toward collective violence stays the same across conditions.

We find that attitudes toward collective violence hinge on the target, not the action, though endorsement of more severe action was lower). Attitudes separate into support for violence against out-group members (diffuse collective violence) vs out-group leaders (upward collective violence).

When we supply information that pro-environmental initiatives are popular, it does not actually affect anyone’s own opinions on these issues. However, it does lead people to view most policies as more feasible – especially those who previously underestimated support – but only temporarily.

It turns out that the German public, by and large, were accurate in their assessments that pro-environmental initiatives are rather popular! When their initial assessments were wrong, however, the information we provided them durably improved their accuracy.

Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that close election winners display higher in-party warmth than close election losers. This is most robust for House elections.

In an Appendix, we also find, interestingly, that post-election declines in in-party warmth for election losers primarily occur well after the election rather than during the initial loss.

Losers de-polarizing compared to winners post-election, primarily due to greater reductions in in-party warmth, tends to hold in most presidential elections we study. While we did not explore this a ton in the paper, it's interesting that the effects of election outcomes appear to decline over time.